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ABSTRACT 
 
QUAKER OF VIRTUE: HERBERT HOOVER AND HIS HUMANE FOREIGN 
POLICY 
 
by 
 
Ryan T. Peters 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Glen Jeansonne 
 
 
 
This study examines the major foreign policy events of Herbert Hoover’s presidency.  
The thesis uses newspapers, presidential memorandums as well as memoirs from key 
cabinet members in Hoover’s administration to bring into account Hoover’s background 
and upbringing as a motive for how he dealt with foreign policy issues throughout his 
four years in office and brings to light his efforts to create a better and more peaceful 
world.  Beginning with his childhood, Hoover began to develop moral and character 
attributes that taught him the importance of helping neighbors and always acting humane 
when it came to issues of war, pain and suffering.  Hoover organized massive relief 
efforts in Europe during and after World War I, saving millions from starvation and 
death.  As President-elect, he traveled to Latin America on a quest for “good will” to 
repair a fractured United States-Latin American relationship.  The Quaker strove for 
world peace and his administration took part in several disarmament conferences with the 
goal of reducing arms and ultimately an elimination of war.  He also developed and set 
the precedent for summit diplomacy as a means of achieving peace and good will.  The 
Manchurian Crisis of 1929-1933 brought Hoover’s humanitarian policy to the Far East.  
The President implemented numerous decrees and steered his Secretary of State toward a 
iii 
 
pacific resolution of the conflict.  By securing peace in the Far East, Hoover kept the 
United States out of war and averted senseless death and destruction.  Following the 
signing of the Versailles Treaty, intense and heavy-handed reparations were placed upon 
Germany.  As a result, the economies of Europe collapsed and resentment developed in 
the citizens of Germany.  Hoover attempted to curb the banking failure by implementing 
a debt moratorium and standstill agreement in an effort to nurse European economies 
back to health and prevent the spark of another world war.  Ultimately, this study, by 
blending Hoover’s moral character, ambitions and determination with his humane 
policies, attempts to dispute misconceptions of Hoover and his presidency.  It adds to the 
missing historiography and strives to bring Herbert Hoover from the prejudice of 
condemnation and into more favorable light. 
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Introduction: West Branch Values 
 
 Herbert Clark Hoover was born in a modest one-story, three-room farm cottage in 
the small town of West Branch, Iowa on August 10, 1874.
1
  He was the middle child, 
having an older brother, Tad, and younger sister, Mary.  Born on the edge of the frontier, 
his childhood was typical of a boy raised on the plains of middle-America.  His days 
were filled with the excitement of swimming in the local creek, fishing for pan- and cat-
fish and camping in the summer months, as well as sledding down snow-covered hills in 
order to satisfy a craving for speed during the long and harsh Midwestern winters.
2
  
Hoover reflects on the days of his youth in the first volume of his memoirs: 
I prefer to think of Iowa as I saw it through the eyes of a ten-year-old boy.  
Those were eyes filled with the wonders of Iowa’s streams and woods, of 
the mystery of growing crops.  They saw days filled with adventure and 
great undertakings, with participation in good and comforting things.  
They saw days of stern but kindly discipline.
3
  
 
  The days of chores, labor and school, planting corn, hoeing gardens, learning to 
milk cattle and sawing wood were unique to young Herb’s life because of his staunch 
Quaker upbringing.  In fact, Quakerism dominated his environment as both his parents 
were practicing Quakers, or more properly known as “Friends”.  His father, Jesse, was a 
blacksmith.  His mother, Huldah, was educated as a school teacher and became an unpaid 
Quaker minister.
4
  Quakers emphasize “Inner Light,” that is the spark within that 
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provides a direction for one’s moral compass.  The idea that every individual uses 
intuition and conscience and that each person resembles a floating vessel in the grand sea 
that is God, is central to the Friends’ beliefs. The Quaker sect preaches and practices 
humility, charity, equality and the treatment of all men as brothers.  Friends protest 
against boasting and flaunting, instead focusing on adherence to “plain clothes” and 
“plain language.”  They are pacifists and opposed to slavery and racism.  They take pride 
in their work and idleness is discouraged.  Life revolves around the family, home and 
community.  When Quakers encounter hard times, they are helped by their neighbors and 
the whole sect works together.
5
  These ideals became central to Hoover’s moral code.  
They would come to fruition during his relief efforts in Europe and his good will toward 
Central and South America. 
 Quakers believe that “every man was enlightened by the divine light of Christ” 
and each member of the sect should “regularly ask themselves a list of demanding 
queries, a self-examination of virtues ranging from human brotherhood to moderation of 
speech and honor in one’s worldly dealings.”6  This “asking themselves a list of 
demanding queries” comes during prayer.  Quaker services are held in a public meeting 
house and are silent, sometimes for hours, until a member is moved by their “Inner 
Light” to speak.7   
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Hoover jokingly describes the hours of meditation in his memoirs: 
Those who are acquainted with the Quaker faith, and who know the 
primitive furnishing of the Quaker meeting-house, the solemnity of the 
long hours of meeting awaiting the spirit to move someone, will know the 
intense repression upon a ten-year-old boy who might not even count his 
toes…it was strong training in patience.8  
 
A literal belief of the Bible is also central to the Quaker religion.  Individual Bible 
reading is part of the Friends’ concept of education, explains Hoover.  Great tolerance, 
conviction in spiritual inspiration and individual responsibility are concepts gained from 
Bible reading.  Even babies are present at the invariable family prayers and Bible 
readings every morning.  By the time Hoover left Iowa at the age of ten, he had “read the 
Bible in daily stints from cover to cover.”9  
 Herb held fast to these teachings.  As a child he never initiated a fight and during 
his adult life he never lost his temper in public.  He always dressed plainly and never 
flaunted his possessions.  Hoover was noted for his philanthropy and became self-
reliant.
10
  In fact, self-reliance was a theme he stressed throughout his adult life and 
political career.  As the Chairman of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium (CRB), 
he challenged the American people to help aid and support those starving in Belgium and 
Northern France.  When the United States entered World War I, Hoover tasked his nation 
with not only becoming self-reliant for their own needs, but also to sacrifice for the 
servicemen and citizens of war-torn Europe.
11
  As historian Glen Jeansonne states, “In 
many respects Hoover’s was a typical Quaker personality: reticent, modest and generous 
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– a man who never boasted and refused to attack others verbally.  Though common 
among Quakers, such traits are rare among politicians.”12  
Hoover’s early teachings of virtues of industry, honesty, truthfulness and 
helpfulness played a major role early on in his life, when he was orphaned by the age of 
eight.  Jesse Hoover died of a heart attack at the age of thirty-four in 1880.  Two years 
later Huldah succumbed to pneumonia after getting caught in a winter storm while 
walking home from a neighboring town where she was preaching.  She was just thirty-
five.  Following their parents’ deaths, Herb and his siblings were split up by the Quaker 
council.  Tad and Mary were sent to live with nearby relatives while Herb was placed in 
the care of his Uncle John on a farm near West Branch.
13
  His time there did not last long 
and the following year, at age ten, Herb was sent to live with relatives in Oregon. 
 Herb was taken in by his uncle, Henry John Minthorn, who was a country doctor 
in Newberg, Oregon, a Quaker settlement in the Willamette Valley.  The young boy was 
at once put to work at chores that included churning butter, feeding his uncle’s team of 
horses, milking the cows and splitting wood.  When Herb turned fifteen, Uncle Henry 
opened a Quaker land-settlement business in Salem, Oregon.  Rather than attend high 
school, Hoover began working at the “distinguished position” of office boy. 14  As 
Hoover describes it in his memoirs, “My duties as office-boy were not very exacting.”15  
In his spare time, the young man was eager to learn.  He kept many of the books used in 
the business, as well as collected others where he could, and became self-taught.  “My 
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boyhood ambition,” he later said while President, “was to be able to earn my own living, 
without the help of anybody, anywhere.”16  Time and time again the Quaker virtue of 
self-reliance steered Herb along the road of life. 
 In the summer of 1891, Leland Stanford, Central Pacific Railroad magnate, 
politician and philanthropist, decided to found a university in memory of his son who 
died of typhoid.  Stanford University was born.  Against the wishes of his own family, 
who preferred he attend a Quaker college, Herb decided to take the entrance exams.  He 
failed.  After being allowed to take the exam again, this time failing some subjects but 
excelling in others, which impressed the professor that administered the exam, Hoover 
was admitted to the university as a member of the inaugural class.  Arriving that fall 
ahead of his classmates, and at only seventeen years of age, Herb became Stanford’s first 
and youngest student.  With spirituality and faith, he was destined to succeed due to his 
own individual effort.
17
  Hoover shined at Stanford.  His determination to succeed on his 
own accord began with his first course, Geology 1, taught by world famous Professor 
John Caspar Branner.  Herb savored the course five days a week and earned money for 
room and board by typing for Professor Branner.
18
  Hoover’s resolve continued as he 
became class treasurer, student body treasurer, managed the baseball and football teams, 
wrote the student body constitution and became well known on campus for his hard 
work, stamina and dedication.
19
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Hoover graduated from Stanford in 1895 with a degree in Geology and went to 
work as a mining engineer.  Again, the diligent hard work of his Quaker upbringing 
would present itself as the newly minted engineer was forced to take a job shoveling ore 
and pushing handcars in the bowels of a mine in Grass Valley, California.  After such 
accomplishment at Stanford, Hoover certainly did not think he would begin his career in 
this fashion.  In his memoirs he tells of his expectations immediately after graduation: 
On leaving college, I needed at once to find some person with a profit 
motive who needed me to help him earn a profit.  At the risk of seeming 
counter-revolutionary or a defender of evil, I am going to suggest that this 
test for a job has some advantages.  It does not require qualifications as to 
ancestry, religion, good looks or ability to get votes.
20
     
     
The optimism present in Hoover quickly met reality when the prospects for a white-collar 
job were soon exhausted.  The engineer instead had to be content earning two dollars per 
every ten hour nightshift, working alongside “good mining men [who] had rooted 
skepticism concerning ‘them college educated fellers.’”21  This work did not bother 
Hoover in the least.  He was happy to be supporting himself, even if just barely. 
 Salvation from the deep bowels of that California mine came soon enough.  In 
October 1897, the London firm of Bewick, Moreing and Company asked Hoover’s boss 
to recommend someone “thirty-five years of age with seventy-five years of experience” 
to help bring American mining technology to the newly capitalized mines of Australia.
22
  
Although lacking those prerequisites, the young engineer was given the job and he was at 
once off to the desolate mining town of Coolgardie, where it rained less than one inch per 
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year, the aborigines scraped out a primitive existence and there was plenty of “red dust, 
black flies and white heat.”23  Hoover said of the place, “Every man here talks of when to 
go home.  None come to stay except those who die….”24 
The Coolgardie mine thrived under the command of the young engineer.    The 
mine earned $65 million in ore and interest for Bewick, Moreing and Company.  The 
firm’s owners were pleased and showed their appreciation by raising Hoover’s salary to 
$10,000 annually.  By the end of 1898, Hoover was given the opportunity to oversee a 
huge new mining operation in China.  He was eager to set out on this new enterprise, 
there was one matter left to do however.  Prior to his leaving for China, Hoover proposed 
to and married the love of his life, Lou Henry, whom he had met during his senior year at 
Stanford.   
Hoover succeeded in China, much like he did in Australia, and was rewarded with 
$250,000 of stock in his company’s firm.25  Although very successful with Bewick, 
Moreing and Company, when his contract expired in 1908, Hoover decided not to renew 
it and instead set out as an independent consultant.  By the time he was twenty-eight 
years old, the Quaker had traveled the world, specialized in resurrecting failing mining 
ventures and proved that the virtues and qualities taught to him as a child had helped steer 
him to where he was as a young man.
26
  The pinnacle of Hoover’s “selfless 
humanitarianism, organizational virtuosity, stamina and fortitude” was still yet to come.27  
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 The engineer was living in London at the outbreak of World War I in 1914.  Over 
the course of the next several years, Hoover mounted massive efforts in multiple 
campaigns of humanitarian service and relief.  His dedication, fortitude and will to 
succeed aided in saving millions of lives of many nationalities.  When Germany declared 
war on France on August 3, 1914, and sent an army of more than 2 million soldiers to 
invade Belgium, Great Britain was pulled into the conflict.  Treaties had been signed to 
ensure Belgium’s neutrality and when Germany violated these treaties, Britain declared 
war on Germany.  Suddenly all British sailings to America were suspended, leaving 
thousands of Americans stranded in Europe and seeking a way back to the United States 
as a safe haven from the brewing war on the European mainland.  Hoover and nine of his 
associates began to organize funds to help their fellow countrymen.  Over the course of 
the next six weeks, Hoover’s group distributed food, clothing, transatlantic tickets aboard 
steamships and cash to more than 120,000 Americans.  They guaranteed more than $1.5 
million, much of it in personal checks, for the evacuation effort.  Less than $400 of the 
loans went unpaid in the end.
28
  This short rescue effort did not go unnoticed.   
 When the Allies mounted a counterattack, they were able to push the Germans 
back to a line about 400 miles long, stretching from the Belgian front to the Swiss 
frontier.  They would stay locked there for the next four years.  All of Belgium, with its 
7.5 million people, along with Northern France’s population of 2.5 million was now 
occupied by the Germans.  The British and French immediately blockaded Germany, its 
allies and occupied Belgium and Northern France as a means of controlling the flow of 
materials and war supplies to the enemy nations.  One consequence of this blockade was 
                                                          
28
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that it also blocked all imports to the occupied areas.  Belgium and Northern France were 
highly industrialized.  Because of this, they depended on imports for seventy percent of 
their food, almost all textiles and clothing and most other raw materials.  Thus, over 10 
million Europeans were desperately caught between the “millstones of the German Army 
and the Allied blockade.”29 
 Belgium and Northern France needed help.  In his memoirs Hoover gives 
examples of just how desperate the situation was.  An excerpt of a telegram from 
American Minister to Belgium Brand Whitlock to United States Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing says, “…now a grave situation confronts the land.  In normal times Belgium 
produces only one-sixth of the foodstuffs she consumes.  Within two weeks, there will be 
no more food in Belgium.”30  Whitlock also appealed directly to President Woodrow 
Wilson stating, “In two weeks the civil population of Belgium, already in misery, will 
face starvation.…”31  Because of his outstanding work in organizing and successfully 
rescuing the trapped American nationals, Hoover was approached by the American 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Walter Hines Page, and a delegation of Belgian and 
other European leaders and asked to lead a mission to save those people from 
starvation.
32
  
 It would be a daunting task due to one specific challenge: diplomacy.  The relief 
effort had to be organized and negotiated directly with hostile military and civilian 
leaders on both sides of the war.  There had to be assurances that the relief was 
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completely neutral.  It would be very costly and that high cost had to be sustainable for 
the duration of the war, however long that may be.  Hoover had to devise a plan to raise 
the money, purchase the supplies and then distribute all the food.
33
  The infrastructure to 
accomplish such a feat would be nothing short of miraculous.  On October 21, 1914, 
Hoover pondered the reality of the situation.  He personally stood to lose his financial 
wealth if he invested in the effort and it failed.  Hoover ignored this possibility and again, 
as he had so many times in his life, called upon his Quaker upbringing and moral code.  
Innocent people were in need and he was going to do anything in his power to help.  “Let 
the fortune go to Hell,” said Hoover, and on October 22, 1914, the CRB was born.34 
 Immediately Hoover went into action as the Chairman of the CRB.  Since no 
effort of such had ever been undertaken, this job demanded improvisation.  Over 350 
volunteers were recruited.
35
  On one occasion, the Chairman selected a volunteer by 
chance.  On an inspection trip to the countryside assessing how best to begin the relief, 
Hoover came across a man and asked, “Hello there, can you make cornbread?”  The man 
replied that he in fact could make cornbread.  “You have a job,” said the Chairman.  It 
turned out the man was once a cook in the United States Navy.  Hoover procured him a 
uniform and the man began giving baking lessons to Belgian mothers trying to feed their 
children.
36
   
Food was bought or donated in the United States, brought to the coast by railroad, 
shipped across the Atlantic, unloaded in Rotterdam and sent from there to local 
                                                          
33
 George H. Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914-1917 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1988), 29-33. 
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 Smith, An Uncommon Man, 81. 
 
35
 Ibid, 84. 
 
36
 Ibid, 87. 
11 
 
 
 
distribution points.
37
  Hoover also requisitioned dozens of mills, bakeries, factories, 
railways and warehouses throughout Great Britain in order to meet demand for food 
shipments.  He tapped into funds held in Belgian banks to continue financing the 
commission.  It was a tough job and Hoover held up to it.  As the stress to maintain the 
relief effort rose, he stretched himself as Chairman.  As President, he would later write, 
“No day went by without a fight to keep part of the mechanism from breaking down.”38  
In keeping with the Quaker faith, when the community encounters hard times, neighbors 
are there to help.  Hoover was merely helping his earthly neighbors.  By the thirtieth day 
after its formation, the CRB had shipped some 25,000 tons of food into Belgium, and 
another 60,000 was en route.
39
 
 Again, harking back to his Quaker upbringing and the values of self-reliance and 
humility, Hoover instructed his aids and volunteers to play up the CRB itself as the true 
hero.  He denounced reporters that praised him, refused foreign decorations and dreaded 
the day when “elderly ladies riding double-decker buses in London might tap him with 
their umbrellas and say, ‘Oh, you are the Relief man, aren’t you?’”40  He never asked for, 
nor did he wish for credit in leading this massive relief effort.  Hoover simply saw 
himself as a man with a mission to save others.  Reporter William Allen White said he 
came away after a meeting with Hoover during the relief project in Belgium and Northern 
France “mesmerized by the strange low voltage of his [Hoover’s] magnetism.”41  
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Ambassador Page said of Hoover, “He’s a simple, modest, energetic little man who 
began his career in California and will end it in Heaven; and he doesn’t want anybody’s 
thanks.”42 
 By the time the fighting ended, Hoover and his men had spent over $1 billion, 
protected millions of Europeans from malnutrition, starvation and nakedness.  The CRB 
had dispensed over 5 million tons of food.  Administrative overhead for the entire project 
was only four-tenths of one percent.
43
  The CRB was the largest privately organized relief 
operation in history.
44
  As the commission wound down it poured more than $24 million 
in profits back into the reconstruction of Belgium and Northern France.  This included 
the rebuilding of universities, a scholarship fund for Belgian-American exchange students 
and an ambitious program of scientific research for a better tomorrow.
45
   
The Chairman reflects in his memoirs on his work with the CRB: 
…none of us thought that the war would last longer than until next 
summer.  Therefore, if we could tide the Belgians over for eight months 
until the next harvests that would end the job.  The knowledge that we 
would have to go on for four years, to find a billion dollars, to transport 
five million tons of concentrated food, to administer rationing, price 
controls, agricultural production, to contend with combatant governments 
and with world shortages of foods and ships, was mercifully hidden from 
us.  I did not know it but this was to be not only a great charity to the 
destitute, but it was the first Food Administration of a whole nation in 
history.
46
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 The CRB brought Hoover to the attention of the world, including President 
Wilson who, when America entered the war in 1917, named him United States Food 
Administrator.
47
  He became responsible for feeding American troops, their allies and the 
people of war-torn Europe for the remainder of the conflict.  “The Food Administration is 
called into being,” Hoover announced at its inception.48  His chief motivation for feeding 
the nations of Europe was to protect young children from starvation.
49
  He writes of the 
sorrowful sight of witnessing hungry children waiting to be fed: 
The Belgians had spontaneously, as in older crises, organized soup 
committees in the poorer districts, and my depression was not lightened by 
them.  There were lines of children waiting for a bucket of soup and a loaf 
of bread, which was the food for the family.
50
 
 
Hoover’s love for children and his want to protect them stemmed back to his childhood 
years as an orphan as well as from his faith.  He was deeply affected by his youth and felt 
that if he could reduce misery in other’s lives then he was contributing to an overall 
moral goodness. 
The Food Administrator rallied the American people to help.  Restaurants took 
wheat products off their menus in order for more bread to be produced for troops and 
civilians in the war.  People started backyard gardens.  Hundreds of thousands signed 
pledge cards admitting them to membership in the Food Administration.  Slogans such as 
“Food Will Win the War” were created.  All of this occurred with Hoover’s leadership.  
Reporter Walter Lippmann wrote that Hoover “incarnates all that is at once effective and 
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idealistic in the picture of America.”51  Within one year, the Food Administration could 
boast of having doubled American food shipments to Europe, without ration cards and 
without interruption of economic freedoms or heavy expenses.  Administrative costs for 
the project totaled less than $8 million.  Again, the Great Humanitarian did not wish for 
any thanks or recognition, personally directing his publicity department to always refer to 
“the Food Administrator” and not to himself.52 
 Hoover’s relief efforts did not end there.  When peace finally settled over Europe 
in 1919, he helped organize and became Administrator of the American Relief 
Administration (ARA).  The administration helped feed twenty-one prostrate nations 
after the war, including Germany.
53
  Hoover attended the Paris Peace Conference at 
Versailles as President Wilson’s food adviser.  The Allies wished to withhold food from 
the defeated Germans as a way of forcing them to sign the treaty.  Hoover was 
instrumental in opposing this.  The ARA Administrator argued that would sow the seeds 
of resentment that may result in a new war later on.
54
  When the Russian famine of 1921 
broke out, Hoover and the ARA led the charge to save 15 million Russians from 
starvation as well as diseases such as typhus, cholera and dysentery.  Hoover persuaded 
President Warren G. Harding and Congress to appropriate $20 million for Russian relief 
stating, “Our people who enjoy so great liberty and general comfort, cannot fail to 
sympathize to some degree with these blind gropings for better social conditions.”55 
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 That same year, when Hoover was appointed Secretary of Commerce under 
Harding, he took that same philosophy to the domestic sphere in America.  Hoover 
envisioned the Commerce Department as the hub of the nation’s growth and stability.  He 
oversaw, coordinated and completely revamped departments and sub-committees in order 
to regulate the entire country from manufacturing to air travel.  Hoover revolutionized 
relations between business and government and sought to make his department a 
powerful service organization.  He forged new cooperatives in voluntary partnerships 
between government and business; all centered on eliminating waste, increasing 
efficiency and demanding a self-reliance from business owners, making them less 
dependent on government aid.  Even Hoover’s “Own Your Own Home” campaign was 
based on the promotion of new long-term mortgages to allow families to purchase first-
time homes, both stimulating the construction industry and instilling a sense of pride of 
ownership in Americans.
56
 
 These various and colossal relief efforts were taken on by Hoover as part of his 
Quaker make-up.  The moral code instilled in him as a child lasted throughout his 
adulthood.  His relief work allowed him a glimpse of those less fortunate and that insight 
made an impact on the man.  Hoover recollects on his experiences and thoughts during 
his days on the battlefields and in the countryside of Europe.  He writes, “As I passed 
though the suburbs of Antwerp, I saw the remnants of burned homes and buildings from 
the battle for that city standing gaunt and naked – my first vision of the war.”57  He goes 
on to describe his depressing and somber feelings as well as his growing hatred of war: 
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But even more depressing was passing through the ruins of Louvain, 
where its homes, its ancient church and its university library, with its 
precious records of centuries, had been destroyed, not in battle, but by 
militarists to terrorize a free people.
58
 
 
The “warring men”, militarists, the aristocratic military elite, the officials who 
chose to wage war and cause death and terror to so many could not even earn sympathy 
with the Great Humanitarian.  Only a few weeks after the armistice was signed, two 
German officials wished to see Hoover but he refused them.  He directed his aide to tell 
them, “You can describe two-and-a-half years of arrogance toward ourselves and cruelty 
to the Belgians in any language you may select.  And tell the pair personally to go to 
Hell, with my compliments.”59  Later, while making his way across a battlefield in France 
where “the soil had yet to swallow up soldiers’ shoes and boots,” Hoover sat silent.  On 
that day, among the vestiges of death, he saw graphic, gruesome evidence of what he 
called “the stupidity of war.”60  
 From a lowly farm cottage on the great plains of the Midwest, to Stanford labs, to 
the arid depths of Australian mines and to the battlefields of Europe, Hoover remained a 
man of virtue.
61
  His ingenuity and moralistic fervor allowed him to make his way in the 
world.  His “selfless humanitarianism, organizational virtuosity, stamina and fortitude” 
allowed him to accomplish feats of relief against overwhelming odds.
62
  The onslaught of 
barbarous memories of war and famine scared him, yet perhaps helped bring forth his 
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Quaker “Inner Light”.  Hoover would strive for the rest of his days to avert war and curb 
the rise in armament competition.  He would use the Quaker practices of humility, 
charity, equality and treatment of all as equals as a humanitarian vehicle for change and 
as a leading motive for future foreign policy decisions.
18 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Good Neighbor Policy 
 
“A nation is visualized abroad by the man who’s running it.”1  This quotation, 
spoken by Henry P. Fletcher, who in 1929 was the United States Ambassador to Italy and 
former Ambassador to Mexico and Chile, answered the question of why Herbert Hoover 
first sought to embark on his Latin American “good will” tour.  President-elect Hoover, 
already a world figure due to his relief efforts in Belgium, Northern France and Russia, 
would soon become the most recognizable symbol of the United States and in doing so, 
would shape how the world viewed his country.  The quotation appeared in an article 
written by Edwin S. McIntosh, a New York Herald Tribune special correspondent who 
accompanied Hoover’s party on the six-week voyage of Latin America.  McIntosh’s 
article analyzed the trip and gave a summary of its “net results.”  The most lasting and 
far-reaching result was that of the rapport built between Hoover and the people of Latin 
America.  Hoover went without power, and sought to receive no obligations of any kind; 
he only hoped to build a mutual esteem and confidence between himself, the United 
States and its “neighbors” to the south.  McIntosh continued:  
Wherever, whatever vision Latin America has of us, whatever her 
increased admiration or dislike may be as a result of Mr. Hoover’s visit is 
embodied in the Latin-American impression of Mr. Hoover, and he is 
himself the answer to the popular question.  If Central and South America 
liked him and trusted him, he left with them that impression of his own 
country.
2
 
 
By sowing good will and creating and nourishing a mutual trust, Hoover was able to 
make an impression that spoke well of not only himself and his character, but that of the 
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American people as a whole.  This he succeeded in doing, and because of it, a better 
background was created for future relations. 
 When President Calvin Coolidge made his announcement on August 2, 1927, 
stating, “I do not choose to run for President in 1928,” Hoover, who was serving under 
Coolidge as Secretary of Commerce, was attending the annual Bohemian Club 
encampment at Bohemian Grove in the California Redwood Forest.
 3
  Within hours of 
this announcement, hundreds of publishers, editors, and public officials from around the 
country descended on “the Grove” demanding to know if Hoover was to announce his 
candidacy for the upcoming election.  The Secretary did not have an immediate answer.  
He wished to speak with Coolidge and find out if he truly intended not to seek a second 
term.  Over the course of the next few months, Hoover tried to convince Coolidge to run 
again.  He indicated that he would much rather serve another term as Secretary of 
Commerce under the incumbent.  However, Coolidge was sincere in his statement and in 
early 1928, Hoover was nominated by the Republican Party to run in the election and he 
accepted.  On November 1, 1928, Hoover was elected President.  He won in a landslide, 
polling fifty-eight percent of the vote against New York Governor Al Smith.  Hoover 
received over 21 million popular votes and 444 electoral votes.
4
  The President-elect 
entered the interregnum with three major tasks at hand.  First, he needed to assemble his 
administrative staff.  Second, he had to formulate his major policies for the next four 
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years.  Third, he and the soon-to-be first lady, Lou Henry, would embark on a six-week 
speaking tour of Latin America.
5
 
United States – Latin American relations during the period preceding Hoover’s 
interregnum were tense, stressed and unstable.  Since the days of President Theodore 
Roosevelt and his “big stick” ideology, Latin American nations were suspicious and even 
feared the United States. This fear was aggravated by American domination, 
economically and militarily.  United States policies appeared intimidating.  Roosevelt 
popularized the adage “speak softly and carry a big stick,” meaning the United States 
should negotiate peacefully all the while enforcing its policy forcefully.  This ideology 
played many roles in Latin America, including the United States’ construction of a canal 
across Central America.  The United States was insistent on building the Panama Canal 
and after it was built, of operating it with its military.  Another aspect of “big stick” 
policy was the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.  Cited in Roosevelt’s State 
of the Union Address of 1904, the Roosevelt Corollary stated that the United States could 
intervene in any conflict between European powers and the nations of Latin America.  
This declaration was meant to ensure that European claims in the Western Hemisphere 
did not lead to the use of force by the Europeans.  Military intervention in conflicts in 
Central and South American occurred under Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Warren G. 
Harding and Calvin Coolidge.  At the time of Hoover’s tour, American troops were 
stationed in Haiti and Nicaragua.
6
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 Hoover believed such policies made the United States appear like a “colossus of 
the north” that acted like a “bully” or a “big brother” to Latin America.7  As Secretary of 
Commerce, he developed and voiced his increasing dissatisfaction with United States 
foreign policy toward its neighbors to the south.  President William Howard Taft’s 
“Dollar Diplomacy” also added fuel to the fire as many Latin American economies were 
supported by investors from the United States.  Dependence on these investors led to 
hostility and the belief that there was interest in exploiting Central and South America 
purely for financial gain, at the expense of its people.  As Hoover states in his memoirs, 
“The United States, to put it mildly, was not popular in the rest of the hemisphere.”8 
 Hoover regarded an improvement in Latin American relations as vital to his pre-
Presidential plans.  The United States and Latin America shared mutual interests, 
common threats and a proximity to one another.  It was crucial that these relations take a 
turn for the better.  The Quaker embarked on this mission with idealistic fervor.  He 
gathered as much information on Latin American people and their cultures as he could.  
The President-elect hoped by better understanding his neighbors, he could earn a respect 
from them.  Hoover did not see himself as the sole “good will” ambassador of the United 
States; he saw every member of his party traveling with him as such.  A memorandum 
was distributed to everyone in the entourage describing the tour and its purpose.  The 
“mission” of the tour as described in the memo was the “good will of Latin American 
republics.”  The “method of attainment” for this mission included an “expression of good 
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will by the very fact of the trip which is itself a compliment” and an “expression of good 
will by bringing out the fact of identical interests along many lines.”9   
Also included in this memorandum were instructions to Hoover’s party on how to 
act and treat the Latin American people.  “All members of the party will make the tour’s 
mission their mission,” the memo stated.  It continued, “The event of the visit is so 
important to these countries that those who may have had unfavorable impressions of 
North Americans are prepared to date a new attitude from this time.”  The memo goes on 
to state that each member will not carry with him or her any attitude of superiority and 
will treat any person they meet as a fellow American of the Western Hemisphere.
 10
 
Mrs. Hoover even made it her business to spread the word as to the “good will” 
nature of the tour.  She received a letter from Mrs. E.M. Phillips of West Union, Iowa 
inquiring as to the purpose of such a journey to the south.  Lou Henry replied through her 
secretary in a return letter, “I can state the purpose of the trip no better than to quote Mr. 
Hoover: ‘Our trip to Latin America was conceived for the purpose of paying friendly 
calls upon our neighbors to the South.’”11 
On the eve of the tour, the New York Times published an article headlined “Stress 
Hoover Trip as Friendly Move.”  The article explained that although Hoover intended to 
deal with problems such as boundary disputes, oil interests and interpretation of the 
Monroe Doctrine, the larger aspect of the trip will be the possibility of “cementing 
cordial relations existing between the United States and the countries to the south….”12  
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The primary focus of Hoover’s journey will be to better relations between the United 
States and Latin America.  The President-elect, his wife and many members of their party 
boarded a special train from Palo Alto, California at 7:30 p.m. Pacific time on Sunday, 
November 18, 1928, and headed for San Pedro, California.  President Coolidge granted 
Hoover the use of the Navy steamships USS Maryland and USS Utah; the Maryland for 
the southbound route of his trip and the Utah for his return trip north.  The Maryland 
made rendezvous with Hoover’s party in San Pedro and set sail the following morning.  
On Monday, November 19, 1928, President-elect Hoover set out on the first leg of his 
“Good Will Tour.”13 
 The tentative plan was for Hoover to visit Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Chile on 
his southbound trip and then on his return north, to stop in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil 
and Mexico.
14
  Nicaragua had been turbulent since the Taft Administration.  
Implementing his “Dollar Diplomacy” policy, President Taft dispatched troops to protect 
American investments.  President Coolidge temporarily removed the troops, but returned 
them during a civil war in 1927.  Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson helped resolve the 
civil war but left the American troops in Nicaragua to help insure order.  In 1928, there 
were 5,000 Marines stationed in that country.
15
  Hoover hoped to negotiate the removal 
of the Marines.  He was received in Nicaragua with open arms.  A recent election had 
been held with the aid of American Marines and Jose-Maria Moncada was elected to 
replace President Adolfo Diaz.  Hoover met with both men and vowed to begin 
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withdrawing the Marines after Moncada’s inauguration on January 1, 1929 (the 
withdrawal actually began about two-and-a-half years later on June 3, 1931).  Only a 
small detachment of Marines would remain to aid in training the Nicaraguan National 
Guard.  Upon his settlement of the troop issue, “prominent Nicaraguans” stated that 
Hoover’s visit “clinched the spirit of good will.”16 
 Hoover’s next major engagement came in Peru and Chile, where he sought to ease 
the tension from the Tacna-Arica Affair.  The Tacna-Arica Affair was a territorial dispute 
between Peru and Chile over the provinces of Tacna and Arica.  It went all the way back 
to the War of the Pacific between Peru, Chile and Bolivia from 1879 to 1883.  Chile won 
the war and conquered both provinces.  When Chile began to colonize the two territories 
in 1909, Peru responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with Chile.  In 1925, 
President Coolidge attempted to arbitrate the dispute; however, the deadlock remained 
unbroken.  Now it was incumbent upon the Quaker to try negotiating peace.  Hoover 
developed a plan he hoped would satisfy both nations and restore friendly relations.  
After meeting with officials from both Peru and Chile, a solution was reached.  In a 
compromise Chile returned the Tacna province to Peru and kept Arica.  Chile also 
compensated Peru monetarily for damages incurred over the four decade old dispute.
17
  
Hoover’s poise and tact secured a simple solution when others had failed earlier. 
 Part of the Quaker’s plan for good will called for an improvement in economic 
relations between the United States and Latin America.  An expansion of trade between 
the two continents was one goal Hoover aimed to achieve.  In Argentina, Hoover 
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discussed tariffs with government officials.  Argentina produced similar crops to those 
grown in the heartland of America.  In order to protect Midwest farmers, the United 
States Tariff Commission had considered increasing tariffs on agricultural products 
imported from Argentina.  This caused tension between the two nations and threatened to 
disrupt economic relations.  Hoover promised to do what he could as President to keep 
tariffs to a level both nations would accept.
18
  Hoover also discussed increasing imports 
and exports between the United States and Latin America.  His massive road building 
plan called for the development of continuous roads from the United States to points in 
the far south of Latin America as a way for goods to travel quickly and freely.
19
  This 
improvement in transportation routes led to a growth in Latin American trade.  At the 
time of Hoover’s trip, United States trade with Latin American nations totaled $959 
million annually.  The President-elect hoped his policies and reforms could increase this 
number exponentially, building a stronger economic relationship.
20
 
 The incoming President’s final stop on his tour was in Brazil.  If “glad” and 
“friendly” are words to be used in describing his reception in other Latin American 
countries, “overjoyed” and “jubilant” can describe the feelings extended to him in Brazil.  
There were no major issues to discuss and no conflicts to resolve in Brazil.  Instead, this 
stopover can be seen as the pinnacle of Hoover’s good will message, merely a neighborly 
visit.  The citizens of that nation showed “expressions of delight” and felt honored to be 
visited by Hoover.  Tens of thousands crowded into a square in Rio de Janeiro’s coffee 
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district to hear the President-elect speak.  The Brazilian Foreign Minister Octavio 
Mangabeira said of this important moment: 
The visit of President-elect Hoover to Latin America is one of those great 
events which are apparently very simple, but may have, nevertheless, 
incalculable effects.  Brazil, which rejoices in the great splendor of the 
United States of America and sincerely wishes to see them upheld by the 
esteem of all American nations, believes that this trip will be a decided 
forward step on the road to mutual concord and confidence, two things 
which will make for the greatness and glory of the American continents 
and the general service of humanity.
21
 
 
Those words wrapped up Hoover’s tour of Latin America.  The following day, January 
24, 1929, the USS Utah put to sea and began steaming for Old Point Comfort, Virginia.  
As he left the Brazilians with the spirit of good will and friendship, Hoover could rest 
assured knowing he accomplished his mission. 
The results of Hoover’s Good Neighbor Policy are far-reaching in their long-
range implications.  They are best described when divided into two categories: tangible 
and intangible.  The tangibles are obvious and can be seen immediately when analyzing 
his trip.  Many Latin American nations asked Hoover’s advice about their domestic 
problems.  His frankness and expertise helped him answer their requests.
22
  He was true 
to his word and the Quaker’s talks with Nicaragua early in his journey promised the 
withdrawal of American troops from that nation.  No longer would the military dictate 
policy there.  Hoover settled the territorial conflict between Peru and Chile after countless 
other leaders had failed over more than forty years.
23
  The President-elect crystallized the 
demand for an intercontinental air service, finally connecting many areas of Latin 
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America to the United States.  This air link made it possible to fly from New York to the 
southern tip of South America at Buenos Aires, Argentina in four days.  This trimmed 
travel time by as much as twelve days, allowing more efficient business to take place as 
well as for the greater interchange of cultures between the continents.
24
 
 Hoover aggressively urged an opening of exchanges in the field of education.  
Upon his return, the President-elect set up a system for exchanging students, professors, 
teachers, scientists, artists  and other professional leaders between universities in Latin 
America and the United States.  This plan was intended to introduce more North 
Americans to their neighbors to the south.  It was meant to expand knowledge and share 
ideas.  By blending cultures in such a way, a better understanding could be achieved and 
a greater degree of respect deserved.
25
 
Hoover boldly promised that there would be no more United States military 
intervention in Latin American affairs, unless the lives of American citizens were in 
danger.  The good will ambassador squelched the Taft policy of “Dollar Diplomacy” by 
declaring that American citizens investing their capital and energies in Latin America 
were doing so at their own risk, and that the government of the United States would only 
intervene on their behalf if they were unjustly treated.  Hoover expresses this promise in 
an address on April 13, 1929: 
I mention one sinister notion as to policies of the United States upon our 
relationships with our Latin American neighbors.  That is, fear of a [past] 
era of the mistakenly called dollar diplomacy.  The implications that have 
been colored by that expression are not a part of my conception of 
international relations.  I can say at once that it ought not be the policy of 
the United States to intervene by force to secure or maintain contracts 
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between our citizens and foreign states or their citizens…far more than 
this, it is the true expression of the moral rectitude of the United States.”26 
 
 Furthering his abandonment of the policies of his predecessors, Hoover directed 
the State Department to issue a revised interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, eliminating 
the idea that the United States was concerned with the domestic affairs of other Latin 
American republics.  This was aimed at combating the belief that the United States was 
the “colossus of the north,” preying commercially upon Latin America and its citizens.    
Edwin S. McIntosh writes that Hoover dispelled the perception that the “giant of the 
north” was instituting a program of imperialism and aggression.27 
 As stated previously, prior to embarking on his journey, Hoover attempted to gain 
as much information as he could and learn as much as possible about the people, customs 
and cultures of all Latin American nations.  As a final good will gesture and as a means 
of advancing relations between the United States and Latin America, the Great 
Humanitarian removed all political appointees as ministers and ambassadors to the 
southern neighbors.  Many of these appointees were not well suited to serve as 
representatives of the United States.  They were not fluent in Spanish or Portuguese; they 
were unfamiliar with Latin American traditions as most of them were used to serving in 
European countries.  In addition, to them, this may as well be just one more “stop” on 
their career paths.  Hoover chose instead to send “private, independent, career men” who 
possessed a background of experience with the country which they were serving, with 
knowledge of its “people, language, customs and culture.”28  These tangible results of the 
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Quaker’s policy were advanced and practical.  Their significance became evident almost 
immediately and entirely transformed United States – Latin American relations. 
 The intangible results of the visit, which better represented the meaning and 
purpose of Hoover’s policy, assisted in mending the tattered relations of the Western 
Hemisphere.  Hoover describes these results as relating to the “moral field.”29  Reporter 
Mark Sullivan writes: 
Mr. Hoover’s South American journey was an important national service, 
a tour of duty accompanied also through the nature of the case by pleasure 
to both the hosts and the guests…the journey has had scores of different 
kinds of usefulness, all of which are important and some of which will 
continue as long as South America and North America sit side-by-side.
30
 
 
The good will ambassador represented the United States with courtesy and 
respectfulness.  He helped to dissipate the predisposed belief of diplomacy as a sinister 
shadow looming over Latin America.  He created confidence between continents that 
extended far into the future.  Sullivan goes on to explain that one of the greatest 
characteristics of the President-elect’s experience in the south, was his ability to convey 
cordial feelings to government officials, political and business leaders and citizens in the 
streets.  He accomplished this through hours of informal, but intensive, conversations and 
visits. The President-elect also made fourteen speeches during his trip voicing his mission 
of peace and good will.  “I come to pay a call of friendship,” he stated.  “In a sense I 
represent on this occasion the people of the United States extending a friendly greeting to 
our fellow democracies on the American continent,” adding, “I would wish to symbolize 
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the friendly visit of one ‘good neighbor’ to another.”31  This set a “strikingly successful 
precedent doubtless to be renewed by some future presidents.”32   
Latin America knew Hoover as a humanitarian because of his relief in Belgium, 
Northern France and Russia.  This gave him a uniquely favorable standing that offset the 
suspicion commonly held against the United States.  His humanitarianism continued 
toward Latin Americans.  In 1928, a devastating hurricane struck Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands, leaving destruction and a three year drought.  Hoover visited these 
countries in March 1931, making relief and economic development his priority.  The 
President used $600,000 from ARA surplus funds and another $150,000 raised privately 
to provide milk for infants.  He secured $7 million from Congress for relief.  Hoover 
expanded lunch rooms to help feed thousands of children who would otherwise go 
hungry.  Latin America had heard of the Great Humanitarian’s work far across the 
Atlantic, and they now experienced his good will first-hand.
33
 
 Hoover traveled to Latin America seeking “mutual prosperity.”  He sought to 
extend an olive branch of friendship from one neighbor to another.  He effectively pushed 
back against typical American foreign policy of the time and eagerly wiped out the 
existing barriers between the two continents.  He “demanded a better understanding of 
character, habits of mind, manner of living and characteristics” of the nations he visited.34  
Hoover felt this could be achieved only through personal observation and contact.  An 
article titled “This Good Will Business” appeared on the front page of the The Catapault, 
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the official newspaper of the USS Maryland.  It was published mid-way through 
Hoover’s journey and gives an excellent synopsis of the intangible results of “good will.”  
“The best things in life are free,” begins the article, “You give your neighbor good will, 
which costs only the trouble of expressing it, and receive in turn his good will which has 
for you a value beyond conversion to material terms.”35  The need for this “free good 
will” existed for years prior to the President-elect’s tour; he was, however, the much 
needed vehicle to secure it.  In his memoirs, Hoover ends the discussion on his Latin 
American “Good Will Policy” with this quote, “As a result of these policies, carried on 
throughout my administration, the interventions which had been the source of so much 
bitterness and fear in Latin America were ended.  We established good will…under the 
specific term ‘good neighbors.’”36
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Chapter 2: Disarmament 
 
 World disarmament was consistently a central theme present in Herbert Hoover’s 
life since the days of World War I and the atrocities he witnessed on the battlefields.  
Disarmament, along with finding a way to settle disputes peacefully through mediation 
and arbitration, became pillars of his foreign policy.  For those who believe Hoover was a 
passive president, the issues must be reviewed again.  He was the most active world 
leader when it came to directing initiatives toward disarmament and he considered 
preserving peace in the world as humankind’s greatest challenge.1  That challenge, 
Hoover believed, must be taken on by all nations, and the United States would lead the 
way.  He states in his memoirs, “My ambition in our foreign policies was to lead the 
United States in full cooperation with world moral forces to pressure peace.”2   
As part of his program for world peace, the President tried to “encourage 
settlements of disputes through treaties, arbitration and international organizations.”  He 
also strived to curb the escalating arms race between the major world powers, namely the 
United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.
3
  The Quaker believed that an 
uncontrolled arms race would eventually lead to another war.  Instead, military forces 
should be limited and used for defensive, rather than offensive purposes.  “My policies in 
national defense and world disarmament had one simple objective.  That was to insure 
freedom from war to the American people,” Hoover writes in his memoirs.  He continues, 
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“The American concept had always been arms for defense, not for aggression….”4  
Hoover was not for unilateral disarmament however.  He believed that the evil forces 
present in the world were a major threat to peace and prosperity.  Weakness in defense 
would invite war.  He therefore suggested disarmament to the lowest level necessary to 
maintain an adequate defense.
5
  “The size of naval and military forces required to insure 
our country against aggression rests partly upon our foreign policies and partly upon the 
relative strength of possible enemies,” writes Hoover.  The President expressed these 
ideas in his acceptance speech at Palo Alto, California on August 11, 1928, again at his 
inauguration on March 4, 1929, as well as in three subsequent speeches.
6
  It became clear 
that Hoover intended to pursue peace through disarmament from the outset of his 
presidency. 
Next to world peace, a second reason for the President’s desire for disarmament 
was to save money during hard economic times.  Hoover viewed armaments as an 
impediment to economic rehabilitation because arms expenditures weighed heavily on 
government finances.  By 1931, the world was spending over $5 billion annually on 
arms, an increase of seventy percent since World War I.
7
  Arms buildup, the President 
felt, would lead to military conflict.  Hoover focused on naval disarmament as the logical 
place to begin.  The United States had the world’s second largest navy, behind only Great 
Britain, and the highest military budget in the world.  Twenty-five percent of tax dollars 
                                                          
4
 Hoover, The Cabinet and the Presidency, 338. 
 
5
 Jeansonne, The Life of Herbert Hoover: Fighting Quaker, 157. 
 
6
 Hoover, The Cabinet and the Presidency, 338. 
 
7
 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Herbert Hoover: The ‘New Era’ and American Foreign Policy, 1921-1929,” 
in Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce: Studies in New Era Thought and Practice, ed. Ellis W. 
Hawley (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1981), 157. 
34 
 
 
 
were devoted to defense.  The President believed this was excessive, drained money from 
productive purposes and that it led to increased taxes.  The savings from trimming the 
military budget could be put toward job creation.  The Quaker felt that the United States 
should lead this charge of naval reduction, yet it could not go it alone.  America needed a 
strong ally, one that would support and assist in pressuring and mobilizing world opinion 
against aggressors.  Hoover found this ally across the Atlantic Ocean; Great Britain 
therefore became the latchkey to naval reduction.
8
 
The United States and Britain had been engaged in competitive naval building for 
years.  The goal became one of simply “outbuilding” or possessing a greater military 
force than that of the other.  Britain maintained that it needed a large navy in order to 
preserve and protect its vast empire.  America on the other hand, reasoned it must 
continue to build and maintain a navy because it was responsible for protecting the entire 
Western Hemisphere from aggression.  This naval race was spiraling out of control.  
International naval limitation and reduction was inaugurated in 1921 by Secretary of 
State Charles Evans Hughes.  The Washington Naval Conference of that same year hoped 
to stop the needless, expensive and dangerous naval arms race.  The conference was 
attended by nine nations, including the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan.  
During the course of three months from November 1921, to February 1922, the major 
powers hashed out an agreement on ratios of tonnage limiting battleship, or capital ship, 
construction.  The ratio was set 5:5:3 for the United States, Britain and Japan 
respectively, with an allowance considerably lower for the other nations.  This, however, 
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left out all other categories of ships, which at the time accounted for seventy percent of 
all naval tonnage.
9
 
A more general attempt at disarmament was initiated by President Calvin 
Coolidge at the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927.  The President called upon the Big 
Five Powers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to again convene 
and extend the limits of the Washington Conference to cruiser, destroyer and submarine 
class vessels.  Britain and Japan accepted, while Italy and France declined the invitation.  
The United States and Britain entered the talks on completely opposite ends of the 
spectrum and their disparity was never resolved.  American delegates demanded parity 
with Britain and Japan wished for seventy percent of that relative strength.  The 
conference was a complete failure and adjourned without meeting any commitments.  A 
major cause of the failure was the lack of preparation between the United States and 
Great Britain.
10
  Had both nations attempted to solve some of their discrepancies prior to 
the actual conference, the results may have been favorable.  The problem was there, the 
issues were set and two attempts failed; now it was up to the pragmatic Quaker to 
succeed where others could not. 
Prior to his inauguration, Hoover asked the American Ambassador to Belgium 
and his close friend, Hugh S. Gibson to work with him in drafting a speech on global 
disarmament and deliver it to the League of Nations’ Committee on Disarmament.  In 
this speech, the President and Gibson developed a new formula for rating naval strength 
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among the major powers.  The accepted formula at the time was based upon a principle 
of measuring “yardsticks,” or raw tonnage of naval vessels.  Hoover’s plan called for a 
“flexible yardstick” approach.  This revolutionary idea would take several different 
statistics into account such as: tonnage, type of vessel, size of guns on the ship and the 
number of ships in each category.  Hoover believed this recipe would facilitate 
compromise.  Gibson delivered the speech to the League of Nations in Geneva, 
Switzerland on April 22, 1929, and a new disarmament conference was proposed to take 
place in London early the following year.
11
 
The President, not wanting to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors, and wanting 
the conference to succeed, insisted it not assemble until the proper “preliminary” steps 
took place.  “Adequate preparedness,” he claimed, “is one of the assurances of peace.”12  
He hoped that the major powers could agree on basic principles first and then only meet 
to hammer out the final details.  The first step in the London Conference preliminaries 
was for the United States and Britain to come closer together in agreement in order to 
facilitate the conference.  Hoover sent an invitation to British Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald asking him to sail to America for a face-to-face summit.  The immediate 
purpose for this invitation was to settle the remaining questions prior to London.  There 
were hopes of laying down a firm foundation for agreement.  The technical problems of 
the “flexible yardstick” would be ironed out.  Other problems to be discussed included 
Great Britain’s air bases in the Western Hemisphere and debts owed to the United States 
from World War I.  The visit also had broader intentions.  Both men would try to 
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eliminate much of the friction between the United States and Britain.  This friction had 
built up as suspicion and antagonism on both sides led to naval arms buildup.  Before 
departing for America, MacDonald delivered a speech in which he announced his 
objectives.  “I go on a voyage of exploration and the object of my quest is the united 
voice of the United States and Great Britain in behalf of world peace,” he stated.13  The 
Prime Minister continued that he hoped this visit would employ the most important 
yardstick of all, the “yardstick of friendship.”  By establishing an Anglo-American 
friendship, peace and security could be ensured.
14
 
MacDonald and his daughter, Isabel, sailed for America on September 28, 1929, 
arriving in New York on October 4.  Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson met 
MacDonald’s ship and accompanied the Prime Minister through ticker tape parades in 
New York City and again in Washington.  MacDonald stayed in the White House’s 
Lincoln Bedroom and was the guest of honor at the Hoover Administration’s first state 
dinner.
15
  The newspapers hailed this summit as groundbreaking.  Never before had an 
English Prime Minister traversed the Atlantic to pay a visit to America.  “The true 
significance of the MacDonald visit…is to produce an atmosphere which will make it 
possible for both countries to banish the thought of competitive armament…,” explained 
the Washington Star, “and to enable them to assume a leadership in world affairs making 
for world peace.”16  MacDonald believed personal contact between those actually 
responsible for government was essential to understanding and developing a successful 
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future conference.  He also hoped his summit with Hoover would help form a preparatory 
commission on disarmament for the League of Nations, allowing the League to later 
summon a general disarmament conference.
17
 
Upon MacDonald’s arrival in Washington, he and the President traveled to Camp 
Rapidan, Hoover’s fishing retreat in the bucolic Blue Ridge Mountains of Madison 
County, Virginia.  This country outing was meant to be very casual.  Hoover wished to 
show the Englishman “American informality.”  Only one state department official made 
the trip; otherwise no reporters or advisors from either side were present.  Although the 
British Admiralty urged MacDonald to take a technical advisor with him, the Prime 
Minister refused because he “wished to say things to the President in furtherance of 
understanding between the two countries which he would not be able to say before a 
naval officer, British or American.”18  This informality allowed for camaraderie between 
the two men, without the bickering that often occurs between political and military 
professionals.
19
   
Over the next several days, the Prime Minister and the President spent virtually 
every daylight hour together.  They walked along creek paths, fished and even chatted for 
a time sitting on opposite ends of a log overlooking the Rapidan River.  They discussed 
only a few major issues but covered other topics as well.
20
  Hoover offered to erase 
British war debt in exchange for England’s withdrawal from Bermuda, Trinidad and 
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British Honduras, which he wanted for defensive purposes.  MacDonald was reluctant but 
agreed not to dispatch English warships to the Western Hemisphere.  Both men concurred 
that the upcoming London Conference should expand on the work done at the 
Washington Conference.
21
  Freedom of the seas was also discussed.  Hoover proposed 
that in times of war, food ships be immunized from attack in the same manner hospital 
ships were.  This would save millions from starvation, particularly innocent women and 
children.  The Prime Minister was sympathetic to the idea but when he put it before the 
British Admiralty it was vetoed.  Traditional British military policy was to win wars by 
starving the enemy through a blockade, including the sinking of enemy food ships.
22
  
MacDonald later informed the President about the rejection with what Hoover felt was 
“genuine regret.”23  Being a man of impeccable moral character and constantly looking to 
help his fellow earthly neighbors by any means possible, the Quaker balked at starving 
civilians and after World War II wrote in his memoirs: 
When historians come to write the true history of the Second World War, 
to explore its causes, to examine the useless slaughter of millions of 
women and children and weigh the minor military advantages of the 
renewed blockade, they will agree that this proposal would have 
diminished the causes of war, reduced its horrors and saved millions from 
starvation.  And had the proposal been in force, it would not have changed 
the outcome of the war one iota as soldiers, officials and war workers get 
their food anyway.
24
     
 
 MacDonald felt quite the same way.  In fact, this became a measure of common 
ground and understanding between the two leaders.  Hoover faced a constant struggle 
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with American military leaders over what they perceived as a weakening of foreign 
policy.  The Prime Minister also encountered resistance and animosity from the British 
Admirals, of whom a MacDonald secretary called “old salt-sea dogs of war.”25 The 
Admirals were suspicious of MacDonald’s summit with Hoover.  They believed both 
men wished to completely sacrifice naval superiority in the name of world peace.  They 
thought of the two world leaders as “two welfare workers” involved in a “conspiracy to 
injure that greatest safeguard of world peace and world stability, an impregnable navy.”26 
 Upon returning to Washington from Rapidan on October 7, 1929, MacDonald 
issued official invitations to five major naval powers including the United States, Britain, 
France, Italy and Japan to convene at the London Naval Conference in early 1930; a 
conference that was called “one of the greatest since the armistice” as well as a “giant 
stride for peace.”  London was picked rather than Washington because Great Britain was 
a member of the League of Nations whereas the United States was not.
27
   
The Hoover – MacDonald summit was a success.  Again, as was the case with 
Hoover’s Latin American “good will” tour, the intangible accomplishments are more 
significant than the tangible results.  The visit contributed to a better understanding 
between the President, Prime Minister and their respective nations.  MacDonald was 
quoted as saying of his meeting, “I have achieved more than I hoped in the way of peace, 
parity and good will….”28  The principle aims of moral over material results were 
achieved through informal, friendly talks; a personal contact that “contributed 
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immeasurably” toward lasting peace and success.  A significant foundation was 
established that would help ensure success at the upcoming London Conference.  The 
symbolism and bonding between the two men increased their world-wide popularity and 
called greater attention to their mission.  The event became the featured journalistic event 
of the entire month of October, gaining greater recognition in American newspapers than 
the stock market crash.
29
  Historian L. Ethan Ellis writes, “MacDonald’s obvious 
sincerity, his artfully homespun manner…the idea of the two statesmen mulling over 
great matters in a sylvan glade, caught the popular fancy as few things had done in many 
months….”30   
The greatest achievement of this face-to-face summit however, became the 
precedent it set.  It broke through the barrier that was the Atlantic Ocean.  No longer 
would diplomats and world leaders simply speak to the President via the transatlantic 
telephone, through ambassadors and representatives or with telegrams; a new world in 
summitry was opened up.  A peacetime summitry was created.  Hoover would receive 
two other foreign dignitaries during his tenure in office, French Prime Minister Pierre 
Laval in October 1931, and the Italian Foreign Minister Count Dino Grandi one month 
later.
31
  This summitry would transcend Hoover’s Presidency and continue to play a 
major role in United States foreign policy during every successive administration.  
 With the preliminaries complete, the stage was set for the London Naval 
Conference to convene in January 1931.  This marked the third attempt at solving the 
delicate problem of harmonizing naval armaments with political necessities.  At the  
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Washington Naval Conference political concessions were traded for naval considerations 
under civilian control, at the Geneva Conference the opposite occurred; a surrender of 
civilian control led to discussions by professional negotiators.  Both conferences failed.  
Neither technicians nor politicians could muster sufficient acumen for an agreement.  
Still the main difficulty was finding parity.  Great Britain wanted strength with a higher 
number of lightly armed vessels to better protect its empire, while the United States 
demanded equality at the lower tonnage level vessels, with an emphasis on larger gun 
caliber and longer range.  France and Italy, engaged in a battle for control of the 
Mediterranean, wanted a greater number of smaller vessels.  Ellis writes, “Technical and 
strategic factors thus pushed each side toward equally irreconcilable and inflexible 
positions.” He continues, “Fundamentally the conferences failed because neither of the 
chief antagonists would surrender previously assumed and mutually incompatible 
positions.”32   
 At London, things were different and Hoover was adamant that previous failures 
would not be repeated.  New leadership on both sides paved the way for accommodation.  
The engineer in Hoover pressed him to work towards a union on the issues in the name of 
wasted money.  His Quaker background predisposed him to seek solutions in terms of 
international good will.  His ideas are explained in a speech given prior to the conference: 
The time has come for all governments to take steps and adopt policies in 
conformity with the earnest and wise desires of their nationals to organize 
the world on a peaceful basis.  The roads leading to peace and 
disarmament do not lead in opposite directions.  They are parallel.  War 
machines will only be reduced and preparations for war will only cease as 
peace machines are built up.  [Rather than rely on brute force], nations 
should pool their moral resources and concentrate their efforts in the 
promotion of peace and the prevention of war.  War machinery is needed 
if disputes are to be settled by force, but if disputes are to be settled by 
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peaceful processes, instead of violence, machinery for conference and 
conciliation must be built up and used by all the nations.
33
   
 
Prime Minister MacDonald took a similar stance when it came to using “moral 
resources” rather than force to resolve conflicts.  Taking what historian Raymond G. 
O’Conner phrased “probably the most important concession made by any statesman” 
during the London Conference, MacDonald expressed his willingness to extend a 
compromise on the American issue of parity.  This moral, good will gesture would, in 
effect, surrender Britain’s longtime supremacy over the seas.34 
 The American delegation departed for London on January 7, 1930.  The 
delegation was picked by Hoover with the goal of public support and keeping in mind 
that any treaty drafted would require ratification by Congress.  Heading the delegation 
was Secretary Stimson, in his first great challenge as Secretary of State, and Secretary of 
the Navy Charles Francis Adams.  Also among the American representatives was 
Ambassador to Mexico Dwight W. Morrow, Ambassador to Britain Charles G. Dawes, 
Ambassador Gibson, Democratic minority leader Joseph T. Robinson and senior 
Republican David A. Reed.
35
   
From the outset the discrepancies began to appear.  The United States and Great 
Britain were generally in concert except for American insistence on arming cruisers with 
larger eight-inch guns, whereas most cruisers of the time carried only six-inch guns.  
Britain preferred a greater quantity at the lower caliber.  Japan, already stretched by 
limited resources, was amenable and only opposed the proposed ban on submarines.  
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Japan also sought a more comparable ratio of submarines with the other powers, deeming 
this necessary for defense of its island nation.
36
  The issue of six-inch versus eight-inch 
guns was eventually resolved when the United States’ delegation reduced its demand for 
a cruiser fleet of twenty-one vessels to eighteen.  This compromise came as a direct result 
of Hoover’s newly developed “flexible yardstick” formula.  The American delegation 
found the British willing to use the term “yardstick” more optimistically than ever before.  
Other facets of this accommodation included a combination of factors such as speed, 
armor, maneuverability and age of the fleet.  These statistics were aimed to arrive at a 
balance of effectiveness among categories of vessels.  This allowed for an extension of 
the battleship ratios developed at the Washington Conference to smaller vessels.
37
   
With the United States, Britain and Japan coming to agreements and helping to 
ensure a general success of the London Conference, the most difficult challenges came 
from France and Italy.  The French and Italians were engaged in competition in the 
Mediterranean.  This Franco-Italian rivalry caused an intense amount of friction.  Both 
wanted to keep negotiations of smaller vessels out of the conference because they 
deemed these types of ships essential to their fleets.  France also insisted on superiority 
over Italy due to its larger empire, yet Italy demanded parity with France.  As a smaller 
nation, realistically, it could neither afford to achieve nor maintain such status.
38
    
France was suspicious of what it termed the “Anglo-American yardstick.”  The 
French delegates feared that the United States and Great Britain were furthering their 
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domination of the seas, leaving France vulnerable.  France was concerned that Germany 
would again rise to be a major military power and threaten peace in Europe.  Therefore 
the French were almost inflexible about disarmament.  With the events of the Great War 
still present in French minds, they distrusted the existing peace machinery.  The Locarno 
Treaties of 1925, intended to calm the European diplomatic climate, failed to bind Great 
Britain securely enough to protect France, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was all 
but toothless when it came to preventing war, the French believed.
39
  Therefore, France 
insisted on a security pact with the United States and Britain.  The French delegates were 
seeking guaranteed protection in exchange for naval reduction.  The British, fearing the 
potential for being dragged into another land war on the European mainland, were 
reluctant and ultimately rejected the idea.  Stimson recommended that the United States 
accept the proposal.  Hoover was against the idea.  The President was not opposed to 
such a pact per se; however, he believed that if the United States was forced to sign this 
“consultation” pact as a means of barter for French reduction in their naval fleet, then in 
the event France found itself in a war, America would be morally bound to give military 
assistance.  He had no belief in such “camouflaged” obligations.  Hoover was also aware 
that Congress would never ratify such a treaty, so he dismissed it saying he did not care if 
France limited its “inferior” navy or not, the major purposes of the conference would be 
accomplished with or without them.
40
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The London Conference was set back when the French government fell on 
February 17, 1930.  The delegates agreed to recess for one week to allow the French 
diplomats to return home and attend to this matter.  This short break allowed Stimson and 
MacDonald to work together quietly and iron out other issues.  This furthered the 
improving relationship between the two nations.  Following the resolution of the collapse 
of a second government in France on February 27, the talks resumed with all parties 
present at the table.
41
  However, with the French and Italians still at odds, by mid-March 
1930, talks were breaking down.  On March 19, MacDonald issued a memorandum in 
which he expressed his disapproval toward the French attitude.
42
 Stimson and 
MacDonald both threatened to adjourn the conference and lay blame on the French 
doorstep.  At the close of March 1930, the early optimism present prior to negotiations 
had eroded.  Instead the United States, Britain and Japan found themselves willing to 
settle on a Three-Power rather than a Five-Power Treaty.
43
 
The London Naval Conference concluded on April 22, 1930, with the United 
States, Great Britain and Japan as signatories.  France refused to sign the major 
agreements.  This eliminated the possibility of the Italians signing because parity with the 
French was not reached.  The treaty resulted in resolutions and ratios in the categories of 
cruiser, destroyer and battleship fleet size and overall tonnage.
44
  America achieved most 
of its objectives, including expanding the Washington agreements to all categories of 
ships.  The United States also gained parity in fleet strength with Britain.  The American 
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fleet remained about the same size with the British fleet reduced by 70,000 tons and the 
Japanese by 40,000 tons.  Submarines were limited to 2,000 tons and aircraft carriers to 
less than 10,000 tons.  The overall ratios in all categories expect submarines was set at 
10:10:6 for the United States, Great Britain and Japan respectively.  All five powers 
signed an agreement to keep submarine warfare within bounds.
45
 
The signed treaty was sent by the American delegation to the President.  Hoover 
submitted the London Naval Limitation Treaty to the Senate on May 1, 1930.  There 
were a handful of senators, big-navy men on one side and staunch isolationists on the 
other, opposed to the treaty.  The Senate took no action and the session expired without a 
vote on July 7.  Within twelve hours, Hoover summoned the Senate back into a special 
session and threatened to keep them there in the sweltering summer heat of Washington 
until they voted stating, “If we fail now the world will be again plunged backward from 
its progress toward peace.”46  It took two more weeks before the treaty was brought to a 
vote.  Wrangling ensued during those two weeks, as every conceivable objection was 
raised.  Some isolationists believed secret agreements embedded in the treaty threatened 
to drag the United States into a future European war.  The President invited any senator 
who suspected these secret arrangements, to review the extensive stacks of letters and 
memoranda and see that no such conspiracy existed.  Hoover also pointed out that the 
treaty did not weaken the United States in any way; in fact, the American Navy actually 
gained slight strength in comparison to the British fleet.  After two weeks of litigious 
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debate, the Senate finally ratified the treaty with an overwhelming vote of 53-4 on July 
21, 1930.  The President signed the treaty the following day.
47
 
The Hoover Administration’s first international negation was complete and ended 
as a first-rate success.  It consummated months of planning and execution.  The 
President, becoming increasingly concerned with the Great Depression, claimed that in 
the interest of the American people, as well as the people of other nations, the treaty 
would save “literally billions of dollars;” approximately $1 billion in the United States 
alone over the following six years.  He stated that had the treaty not been ratified, the 
United States would be forced to spend greatly and gain nothing from competitive arms 
races with other nations.  “It is folly to think that because we are the richest nation in the 
world we can out build other countries,” the Quaker explained.  “Other nations will make 
any sacrifice to maintain their instruments of defense against us, and we shall eventually 
reap in their hostility and ill-will the full measure of the additional burden….”48  Great 
Britain and Japan waited for the United States to act first, then followed suit by 
submitting the treaty to their governments, all of which approved it.  The Anglo-
American breach was healed.  Hoover, continuing to remain true to his Quaker ideals, 
contributed to world peace by seeking to reduce war and misery.  He also reassured the 
world of his country’s peaceful intentions and renewed the faith of the world in the forces 
of moral leadership.
49
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Chapter 3: The Manchurian Crisis 
 
 For Herbert Hoover, his experiences with the Far East began in March 1899 when 
he and his wife, Lou Henry, arrived in Peking, China.  Hoover was working as a mining 
engineer for Bewick, Moreing and Company and traveled to China to take over the 
operation of a newly opened mine.  He and Mrs. Hoover decided to settle in the small 
town of Tientsin.  Over the course of the next several months, the Quaker excelled as an 
engineer.  Although not unearthing any rarities such as gold or diamonds, he did discover 
the largest coal deposit in the world; greater in size than all other coal fields combined.  
The Hoovers were enjoying their time in China and both had even taken up learning to 
speak Chinese.
1
   
However, their prosperity would soon meet trouble.  In the winter and spring 
months of 1900, the engineer and his group began to hear of a new society named the I 
Ho Tuan, or the mailed fist.  The I Ho Tuan’s, more commonly known as the Boxers, 
avowed purpose was to expel all foreigners from China.  They intended to root out all 
connection to foreigners; houses, railways, telegraphs and mines.  They even included 
Chinese Christians and all Chinese who had associations with foreign things.  The threat 
of attack from the Boxers had grown so great that by May, the engineer had called in all 
geological expeditions from the interior of China.  This recall came just in time.  A month 
later, in June, the Boxers laid siege to the mining settlement in Tientsin.  For an entire 
month, the Hoover’s were trapped in Tientsin.  Ill equipped and with only a small number 
of United States Marines, the village rallied together to withstand the attack.  Hoover 
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enlisted the help of his mining staff to fortify the walls of the village.  He also held a vast 
knowledge of the topographical details of the local terrain due to days of horseback riding 
around the area, and was recruited to help as a guide to Marines in an attack against the 
Chinese Army.  Finally, sufficient forces arrived and repelled the attackers.  In early 
August 1900, the Hoover’s departed China and arrived back at the mining firm in 
London.  The future President and his wife had survived the Boxer Rebellion.
2
 
This early experience in China no doubt added to the Quaker’s continued interest 
in the Far East years later in his presidency.  One of his administration’s first experiences 
in foreign policy came in Manchuria during the interregnum in late 1928 and continued 
through the early months of Hoover’s first year in office.  Manchuria, a region located in 
Northeast China and Southeast Russia, was a land of value for several nations of the Far 
East, namely Russia, China and Japan.  It was coveted because it offered a place for 
colonization.  Manchuria also contained vast coal and iron deposits, as well as timber and 
fertile soil.  Connecting these economic resources was a railroad system comprised of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway.  The former line was 
constructed by Russia with financing through a French loan beginning in 1898.  During 
World War I, it fell under allied control.  After the war, Russia and China operated the 
railroad through a joint ownership, yet this ownership was consistently a matter of 
dispute.  The Eastern Line stretched for about 1,000 miles and held significant strategic 
importance for both Russia and China.
3
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Both the Soviets and the Chinese were also eager to gain the upper hand in 
controlling this coveted railway; however, China was the closest in proximity to it and 
became the most aggressive in defending its interests.  The ambitious Chairman of the 
National Government of China, Chiang Kai-shek, sought to manipulate a local warlord in 
Manchuria into provoking a war with Russia.  If he won, the Chinese would gain 
territory.  If he lost, a potential rival to Chiang would be eliminated.  In either case China 
would benefit and stood to consolidate its claims on the railway.  The Chinese 
successfully provoked hostilities that erupted into a skirmish in December 1928.  China 
seized a local telephone line and threatened to take over strategic telegraph 
communications.  The situation escalated in July 1929 when China confiscated the 
railroad.  The Soviets and the Chinese immediately severed diplomatic relations and a 
war appeared all but inevitable.
4
 
Word of the growing conflict spread to America and Hoover, along with his 
Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, began to make plans to intervene to help solve the 
clash.  Both men sought to employ the newly minted Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact as a tool 
of rationale aimed at a ceasefire.  Since Russia and China were both signatories to the 
pact, Stimson declared they were obligated to observe it. 
The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, ratified in August 1928, was a treaty renouncing 
and outlawing war as an instrument of national policy and pledging all signatory nations 
to solve their disputes by peaceful means.  Negotiation for the pact began in early 1927 
when French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand suggested a bilateral treaty of perpetual 
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friendship between France and the United States.  The treaty came out of Briand’s 
proposal, sent to United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, on April 6, 1927, but 
its antecedents are more complex than a mere gesture of an idea.  The foundation of the 
treaty lay in the hope of people everywhere in the western world for peace following the 
Great War.  The war had a lasting effect on those nations that were involved in it.  The 
trauma experienced transcended the boundaries of nations and made the quest for world 
peace and the elimination of war a common theme in the 1920’s.  This became prevalent 
with institutions such as the World Court as well as in such arbitration treaties as the 
Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 and the Locarno 
Treaties of 1925.
5
   
The United States was no exception when it came to a desire for peace and in 
America, a grass-roots campaign against war became a driving force behind Briand’s 
proposal.  Separated from Europe by an ocean, popular sentiment was that America 
should remain isolationist and never again become involved in another international 
conflict.  Moreover, another conflict should never occur.  Major proponents of this idea 
included two private groups: the American Committee for the Outlawry of War and the 
Carnegie Endowment of International Peace.  Created by a prominent Chicago lawyer, 
Salmon O. Levinson, the American Committee for the Outlawry of War established a 
movement with the belief that if war was declared illegal then nations would not resort to 
using it as a means to resolve conflicts.  The thinking held that if nations tried to follow 
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international law, they would not break it knowing they could be punished.  Levinson 
expresses these ideas early in his thesis, published on March 9, 1918: 
Since war is a sanctioned procedure for resolving international conflicts, 
its validity has bred as an inevitable fact of life, permanent military 
preparedness, inescapable competition in arms and constant frictions 
between nations.  When, and only when, punitive measures are applied to 
the international sphere in the same manner that nations penalize offenders 
within their own borders can the world feel safe from aggression.  War, 
though made illegal, might still conceivably occur, but it would be 
branded as a crime and the force of the world would be organized to deal 
with the criminal.”6 
 
The members of this movement became known as “outlawrists” and included such 
notables as Christian leader Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison, philosopher and pragmatist 
Professor John Dewey and Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee.
7
 
   The Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, with two of its officers, 
Nicholas Murray Butler, who was then president of Columbia University, and professor 
of history at Columbia, Dr. James T. Shotwell, also contributed significantly to the 
eventual peace pact.  Butler traveled throughout Europe every summer on behalf of the 
Carnegie Endowment with over half-a-million dollars to dispose of annually in noble 
projects of peace.  In his autobiography Butler states that he met with Briand in 1926 and 
discussed his ideas about a peace pact.
8
  Butler’s assistant, Shotwell, also traveled across 
the Atlantic and met with Briand in early 1927 and suggested the notion of renouncing 
                                                          
6
 Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 107; Louria, Triumph and 
Downfall, 126-127. 
 
7
 David Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1937), 223; 
Louria, Triumph and Downfall, 126-127. 
 
8
 Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1935), 
202-203; Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 108; John Chalmers Vinson, 
William E. Borah and the Outlawry of War (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1957), 176-178.  
54 
 
 
 
war “as an instrument of national policy,” which would become the central theme of the 
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact.
9
   
 With the seed planted, Briand looked to act.  He sought a treaty with the United 
States as a complement to France’s existing system of European alliances.  France was 
still very concerned about Germany’s ability to make war.  Heavy reparations and a 
severe weakening of Germany’s military did not seem to be enough for the French.  As a 
supplement they designed a series of treaties to ensure there would be enough allied 
support to keep Germany at bay.  If France could add the mighty United States to a 
similar treaty, they hoped it would add a greater deterrence.  Aforementioned, Briand 
dispensed a proposal to Secretary Kellogg on April 6, 1927, the tenth anniversary of 
American entry into the World War I.  An official draft of the treaty titled “Draft of Pact 
of Perpetual Friendship between France and the United States” was sent by Briand on 
June 22, 1927.  It included a preamble, three brief paragraphs pertaining to the 
renunciation of war and the settlement of disputes by pacific means.  The opening 
paragraph also asked for the assurance that the United States would vow never to go to 
war against France.  Kellogg demurred on the latter point, which was in fact a “negative 
military alliance,” viewing it as irrelevant because it was almost inconceivable that the 
two nations would ever find themselves at war with one another.  “We have never been at 
war with France and I know of no conditions which would bring on a war…,” stated 
Kellogg.
10
 
                                                          
9
 James T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1929), 12; Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 108. 
 
10
 Louria, Triumph and Downfall, 128-130; Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State and Their 
Diplomacy, 109-113; Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg, 224, 227-229. 
55 
 
 
 
 Secretary Kellogg, as well as President Calvin Coolidge, was immediately 
skeptical of Briand’s proposal, fearing France’s motives might not be altruistic.  After all, 
if France was truly sincere in promoting peace, why had they not accepted Coolidge’s 
invitation to attend the Geneva Naval Conference?  Kellogg suspected, correctly, that 
France was attempting to lure the United States into an alliance in which it could push 
American neutrality to the utmost in the event France became involved in a war.  Kellogg 
had no intention of chaining the United States to such a pact.  He deferred from 
responding to Briand for six months while trying to think a way to reply.  At a Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee meeting on December 28, 1927, Kellogg believed he could 
delay no longer.  He, along with Senator Borah, decided to counter Briand by proposing a 
“multilateral, rather than bilateral, treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national 
policy.”  The phrase “outlawry of war” was changed to “renunciation of war” by Kellogg, 
a lawyer by profession, because he felt the term “outlawry of war” lacked validity and 
precise meaning.
11
   
The Secretary proposed a multilateral treaty for two reasons.  First, it would drive 
Briand into the open, revealing his true intentions for the original draft.  Second, a 
multilateral pact would have greater bearing for enforcement and not force the United 
States into such a tightly bound contract.
12
  “It has occurred to me that the two 
governments, instead of contenting themselves with a bilateral declaration of the nature 
suggested by Mr. Briand,” Kellogg professed, “Might make a more signal contribution to 
word peace by joining in an effort to obtain the adherence of all the principal powers of 
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the world to a declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national policy.”13  The 
treaty would now contain no reservations or qualifications; there would simply be no 
more war between the signatories, and in this sense became what Senator James A. Reed 
of Missouri termed “an international kiss.”14  
 Briand was outraged at the American counterproposal.  Signing with the United 
States was one thing, but to do it with many nations he felt it put too great a faith in 
words rather than armaments.  However, if France now declined to sign such a treaty, 
world opinion threatened to deem them insincere towards methods of world peace.  
Briand sent a counter back to Kellogg demanding the treaty only apply to “wars of 
aggression” rather than all wars.  This would leave “wars of self-defense” as a viable 
option should France find the need to go to war, in particular against Germany.  The 
French still felt vulnerable to the political unrest in postwar Europe and the instrument of 
war may become necessary for practical defensive purposes.  Kellogg, again harking 
back to his legal roots, objected that there was no clear definition for what constituted 
“wars of aggression” versus “wars of self-defense.”  Nonetheless, the clause was left in 
and with the French reluctantly agreeing to the American’s changes, Kellogg set about 
committing other nations to join in the pact.
15
 
 One by one the major powers of the world signed on to the treaty.  Kellogg wrote 
his to his wife in May 1928 announcing his fervor for getting the pact ratified, “If I can 
only get that treaty made, it will be the greatest accomplishment of my 
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administration….”16  The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact renouncing war as an instrument of 
national policy was signed at the Quai d’Orsay Palace in Paris on August 27, 1928.  The 
same horseshoe-shaped table, covered in green baize that serviced the Versailles peace 
negotiators nearly a decade earlier was used by the fifteen signatories that day.  
Eventually a total of sixty-three nations signed the pact.  Ratification and proclamation in 
the United States Senate passed without incident on January 15, 1929, with a vote of 
eighty-five to one, with nine senators abstaining.  The only dissenter was Senator John J. 
Blaine of Wisconsin.  President Coolidge signed the treaty two days later on January 17 
as one of his final acts as Commander-in-Chief.  President Hoover, now in office, 
declared it effective on July 24, 1929.  The pact would rely on moral sanctions and good 
will.  Deterrence from breaking the pact would be the knowledge that in the event a 
nation violated the treaty, the other signatories would be released from their obligations 
to the treaty breaker.  In other words, the remaining signatories would be just in making 
war against the aggressor and that nation would lose all benefits furnished by the treaty.  
The pact was a product of the Great War, of the rising worldwide revulsion against war 
and its miseries and destruction.  It became a milestone in the struggle for world peace 
and earned Kellogg the Nobel Peace Prize for 1929.  The secretary stated just prior to 
Hoover’s declaring the pact in effect, “I have never said that a treaty like this would be a 
sure guarantee against war…but it is an additional safeguard and a great moral 
obligation.”17 
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As it would be, the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact did not prevent war.  No sooner 
had the President declared it effective, than war broke out in Manchuria.  When the 
situation between Russia and China escalated in July 1929, Hoover and Stimson 
attempted to intervene by invoking the pact and distributing messages to the Soviets and 
the Chinese declaring the two warring nations cease hostilities. As historian Glen 
Jeansonne states, “Stimson stirred a hornet’s nest.”18  The United States had no formal 
relations with Russia and therefore Stimson had to relay the message through France.  A 
direct message was sent to China.  Stimson also attempted to obtain collaboration from 
the League of Nations, as they possessed the necessary means to enforce the treaty.  
These efforts proved fruitless.  The Soviets and the Chinese promptly responded that the 
Secretary of State should mind his own business and claimed the United States wished to 
get involved because it held capitalist and imperialistic aims.  Thirty-seven of the sixty-
four signatories followed Stimson’s appeal but these results were negligible as well.  
Japan was also upset that Stimson had not consulted them on the issue prior to sending 
out appeals.  Japan, after all, held vital interests in the region and was close in proximity 
whereas the United States sat half a world away.
19
 
Not only did the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact fail to hinder war from breaking out, 
but it was now proving ineffective in halting conflict.  Prior to his effecting the treaty, 
Hoover proposed a clause be added indicating that if a nation violated the pact, the other 
signatories would sever relations with the violator, set up an investigative commission 
and refuse to recognize any territory gained by the aggressor.  Kellogg disagreed with 
this and it was left out.  Had it been added, it may have given some teeth to the pact.  
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Hoover’s proposal would eventually become the policy of non-recognition in the later 
Stimson Doctrine, however as it was now, neither side took the treaty seriously.  Both 
Russia and China also claimed that each was fighting a defensive war, which was 
permitted under the pact.  Kellogg’s initial hesitation toward the hazy definition of 
defensive verses aggressive wars had come to fruition.
20
   
The fighting continued, although it was relatively light, throughout the summer of 
1929.  Neither country was prepared for a war.  The Russians were still recovering from 
World War I and the Chinese Army was disorganized, undisciplined and poorly armed.  
Then in November, Soviet troops invaded Manchuria, encountering very little resistance.  
Following the invasion, Russia said it was willing to settle the dispute on the basis of the 
status quo ante, going back to before the incident of December 1928.  Eventually both 
sides resolved the conflict themselves on the basis of the status quo ante, which meant 
Russian ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway.  The Sino-Soviet Pact was signed on 
December 3, 1929, nearly one year to the date of the outbreak of hostilities.
21
  This first 
attempt of Hoover and Stimson to promote the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact into a 
consultative agreement was a laudable effort but proved that the treaty was powerless 
against hostilities. 
A second attempt would come soon enough.  Ironically it was Manchuria that 
again became the hotbed of conflict, however this time it would be the Japanese fighting 
with China.  Manchuria had been an old battleground for Japan.  Formally, the region 
belonged to China, but it was ruled by independent warlords (the same warlords Chiang 
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Kai-shek sought to provoke into war with Russia).  Japan wished to use Manchuria as a 
source of raw materials, as a buffer against the Soviets and as an outlet for expansion.  In 
1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth gave Japan rights to capital investments in Manchuria, as 
well as railroad claims there.  The Chinese viewed this as a threat to their sovereignty, 
stating that the Japanese were simply replacing the Soviets.  To the Japanese, the 
ownership of railways and other material holdings were clusters of “vital interest,” partly 
strategic and partly economic.
22
  Japan also believed that maintaining these vital interests 
in Manchuria could be done either by peace (“friendship” policy) or determined 
aggression (“positive” policy).  In 1931, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Kijuro 
Shidehara, was a proponent of peace and the “friendship” policy; more interested in 
Manchuria for economic, rather than military purposes.  The majority of Japan’s military 
however, still following the ideology of Shidehara’s predecessor, Baron Tanaka Giichi, 
believed in Manchuria for the indefinite expansion of the Japanese Empire and in 
maintaining that right forcefully through a “positive” policy.23  Until the fall of 1931, 
Shidehara had managed to restrain the military and other proponents of force.  Secretary 
Stimson explains the Baron’s policy at the time: 
Instead of seeking markets by force, [he] had been following the entirely 
opposite plan of commercial expansion and political good neighborliness.  
[He] had followed this course patiently and in the face of considerable 
difficulty and provocation.
24
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On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops guarding a small section of railroad track 
approximately three miles north of the city of Mukden claim to have been startled by an 
explosion.  Upon investigating the explosion, the Japanese troops claim they saw Chinese 
troops running from the area and, upon pursuing the retreating troops, were fired upon.  
The Japanese maintained that the explosion was the result of a bomb set by the Chinese, 
intending to destroy the railroad.  Later investigations by the Lytton Commission would 
reveal that in fact there was no explosion, no damaging of track and that what came to be 
referred to as the “Mukden Incident” was actually a fabricated story.  In reality, a small 
faction of the Kwantung Army, operating without authorization from Tokyo, took it upon 
themselves to launch an attack on the Chinese in apparent retaliation for the killing of a 
Japanese guard by the Chinese on the South Manchurian Railway.  The attack had 
another genesis as well.  The strong military party of Japan had taken it upon their own 
accord to reverse the “friendship” policy, aiming not only at a “positive” policy but at a 
complete reorientation of Japanese foreign policy toward a program of active 
imperialism.  Their reasoning behind this was that the worldwide depression had 
discredited Shidehara’s policy and cut Japanese foreign trade nearly in half.  The military 
leadership now sought to correct this problem by expanding trade through force.  These 
were perhaps the first shots fired of the Second World War.
25
 
Although the Mukden attack was more or less an act of mutiny, the Japanese 
government did not respond to halt it.  By the following day, Japanese troops occupied 
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Mukden and four other Manchurian towns: Newchang, Changshun, Antung and 
Kaopangtzu.
26
  Hoover and Stimson immediately began following the crisis.  At first both 
men hoped the situation could be resolved internally and the stray military offensive put 
down without United States intervention.  Stimson said on September 22, “It is apparent 
that the Japanese military have initiated a widely extended movement of aggression only 
after careful preparation with a strategic goal in mind.”  He continued on this threat to 
world peace, “If the military party should succeed in having its way…the damage to the 
new structure of international society provided by post-war treaties would be 
incalculable.”27  The Secretary of State also gave indication of the “hands off” approach 
the United States was going to take while giving the Japanese government an opportunity 
to reel in the aggressors before an expansion of the war occurred: 
The evidence in our hands points to the wisdom of giving Shidehara and 
the Foreign Office an opportunity, free from anything approaching a threat 
or even public criticism, to get control of the situation.  My problem is to 
let the Japanese know that we are watching them….”28 
 
The Quaker’s interest in the Far East crisis goes back to his engineering days.  
Already mentioned, he had spent time working closely with the Chinese three decades 
earlier.  Also reason for the interest, not only in Hoover but as far as the United States 
was concerned, was China’s relationship with America.  During the first half of the 
twentieth century the United States had become a world power and subsequently took an 
interest in world affairs.  As a result, America became a leader in developing the Open 
Door Policy in China.  The policy was first enunciated in 1899 by United States Secretary 
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of State John Hay and was later enlarged by the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington in 
1922.  In the treaty, the major powers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan 
and all other nations holding territory in the Pacific, with the exception of Soviet Russia, 
agreed to ensure the territorial and administrative integrity of China and that free access 
of commerce there would be respected by all nations.
29
  Also during this time, America 
had developed an extensive interconnection with China.  This relationship came in the 
form of missionary and educational undertakings for the exchange of knowledge and 
culture.  As author and later National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy writes, “China 
was an important friend of the United States.”30  It was only prudent that America should 
maintain vigilance of the growing situation in support of the Chinese. 
 The Japanese invasion of Manchuria was a flagrant violation of both the Kellogg-
Briand Peace Pact and the Open Door in China.  The problem for the Quaker was how far 
would, or could, he go to cope with this threat?  Again, the President hoped the situation 
could be kept localized, but if it did spread, the United States was a major defender of 
world peace and would be expected to respond.  Rising economic concerns such as the 
Great Depression, Britain jumping off the gold standard and the Hoover Debt 
Moratorium were increasingly taking more and more of Hoover’s attention and time.31  
The great distance between the United States and the Far East also added to the question 
of the degree of intervention the President could make.  He believed, however, that it was 
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again his, and the people of his nation’s, moral obligation to aid in keeping world peace.  
Therefore, when on September 21, 1931, China formally appealed to the League of 
Nations, the President instructed his Secretary of State to cooperate fully with the 
League.  If Geneva would take the lead, Hoover, Stimson and the United States were 
prepared to follow in support.  Stimson relayed a message to the Secretary General in 
Geneva stating, “On its part the American government, acting independently through its 
diplomatic representatives, will endeavor to reinforce what the League does….”  This 
marks a groundbreaking initiative in United States foreign policy; America would act 
together with the League of Nations for the first time.
32
 
 Secretary Stimson began considering courses of action.  He would support 
Geneva’s direct Sino-Japanese negotiations but would favor submission of any policies 
toward the Far East as a joint measure taken by the League and its members along with 
the United States.  In this sense, America’s actions would parallel but still remain 
independent from the League.  This also ensured that the League did not try to “pass the 
buck” on the issue to the United States, as Stimson was wary they might do.  It also 
confirmed to a nation still greatly concerned with remaining isolationist that America was 
not considering joining the League of Nations.  Over the course of the next two months, 
the State Department followed this course of action.  On September 24, America exerted 
its influence on behalf of peace when identical notes were sent from Geneva and 
Washington protesting Japanese action in Manchuria and demanding aggressions cease.  
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These notes were followed by similar ones dispatched by France, Britain and Italy.  The 
notes went unheeded.  Hoover and Stimson were proceeding with caution.
33
 
Early October 1931 marked a turning point in the Manchurian Crisis as well as in 
the President’s and Secretary of State’s course of action.  Despite promises from Japanese 
Ambassador to the United States Katsuji Debuchi that Japan would begin withdrawing 
troops from Manchuria, on October 8, Japanese aircraft began bombing the city of 
Chinchow, which was far removed from the area of original hostilities.  Thousands of 
civilians were killed and this indicated a Japanese intent to expand rather than contract its 
operations in Manchuria.  Suddenly Hoover and Stimson found themselves in a position 
where escalation on the part of the United States might be necessary in order to keep the 
conflict from spreading.  Stimson noted in his diary, “I am afraid we have got to take a 
firm ground and aggressive stand toward Japan.”34  The Secretary now believed he would 
“probably push forward the Kellogg Pact” in order to facilitate an eventual peace 
between China and Japan.  The Quaker still had no intention of employing any drastic 
measures.  The United States had no interest in Chinese or Manchurian soil; at least not 
enough to justify deploying troops for a war.  However, the American role gradually 
increased and a rift began to form between the President and his Secretary of State.
35
 
At the outbreak of the conflict, Stimson sought to be gentle with Japan.  However, 
as events changed and the Japanese took a more aggressive path, the Secretary’s 
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approach hardened.  Shortly after the bombing of Chinchow, Stimson presented Hoover 
with two courses of action; both alternatives to the “hands off” approach the United 
States was currently taking.  Stimson proposed that Hoover either implement economic 
sanctions against Japan or exercise some form of diplomatic pressure in an attempt to 
mobilize world opinion against the Japanese.  Stimson firmly believed in the former 
alternative while the President favored the latter.
36
  The President believed sanctions 
would only inflame the situation.  He stated that action such as an “embargo or an 
attempt to put on economic pressure” was “a step which would be proactive and lead to 
war.”37  Hoover asked Stimson what other option he would have, short of war, in the 
event sanctions failed.  The Secretary sat in silence, unable to provide an answer.  The 
Quaker believed ever since Versailles the term “economic sanction” or “boycott” meant 
war.  He associated war with starvation, broken spirits and a demoralized nation, and he 
was not about to be the cause of such suffering.
38
 
Still Stimson believed this was the best course of action to take.  When the 
League of Nations spoke of an economic embargo on November 19, Stimson brought it 
up for the President’s consideration again.  Hoover again declined to take such action.  
Still the Secretary brought the subject up for discussion three subsequent times: on 
November 27, December 6 and in early February 1932.  Each time the Quaker stood 
unwaveringly in opposition.  In a memorandum to Stimson dated February 23, 1932, the 
President informed his Secretary of State that he would no longer hear any further talk of 
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“sanctions, either economic or military, for those are the roads to war.”39  In that same 
memo Hoover stated that in order to declare sanctions, he would need congressional 
approval.  In order for Congress to approve, they would have to declare war and that was 
“wholly unjustified.”40 
This became a major dividing point between the President and the Secretary of 
State.  In reality, Hoover and Stimson battled on most issues for the duration of the 
conflict.  Historian Richard Current writes that during the Manchurian Crisis, the United 
States was engaged in a sort of “dual diplomacy.”  Hoover looked to diplomatic channels 
as the proper means to implement peace, while Stimson favored economic warfare.  The 
President writes later in his memoirs that he had to wrestle with Stimson for days to get 
his point across to the Secretary and that Stimson always wanted to go with force.  
Hoover realized that his Secretary of State was more the hawk than dove.
41
 
Stimson did give way however.  He admitted that Hoover was the President and 
therefore was in command.  The United States continued to take action by supporting the 
League’s lead.  On October 17, 1931, Prentiss Gilbert, the American Consul General in 
Geneva, was invited to sit in on meetings of the Council of the League of Nations in 
order to create a “united front” and help apply the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact toward a 
resolution in the Far East.  With Hoover’s approval, Gilbert attended the sessions and on 
October 24, Geneva issued a resolution demanding the Japanese withdraw by November 
16.  Gilbert had aided with the first positive League action of the crisis.
42
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As November 16 approached, it became apparent that the League of Nations had 
overreached itself.  The day came and went with Japan in full defiance.  Three days later, 
on November 19, Japanese troops advanced and overran the city of Tsitsihar in northern 
Manchuria.  Simultaneous with the invasion of Tsitsihar, the Shidehara government fell, 
leaving Stimson to say, “The Japanese government which we have been dealing with is 
no longer in control; the situation is in the hands of virtual mad dogs.”43  On January 2, 
1932, the Japanese Army moved again and completely occupied the bomb-ruined city of 
Chinchow.  With that the conquest of Manchuria was complete.  Japanese troops stood 
poised at the Great Wall and threatened to take the conflict into China proper.  Also with 
this climax, Hoover and Stimson’s attempts at “conciliation by restraint” were ended for 
good.  A wholly new phase of American foreign policy began.
44
 
The Quaker in Hoover led him to be a profoundly peaceful man.  Although he 
was outraged by the continued Japanese aggression in Manchuria, he continued to seek 
pacific means for a resolution.  The President was “opposed, in every fiber of his being, 
to action which might lead to American participation in the struggles of the Far East.”45  
Now, with Japan aggressively taking territory in Manchuria against the policies of the 
League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, Hoover had a catalyst for a new 
plan and went into action developing it as a means of applying brakes to the Japanese war 
machine.  The United States would not condone the tearing up of or the forgetting of 
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treaties and it would not take any economic or military action in the Far East.  The 
question Hoover asked himself in the winter of 1931 was, “What would the American 
government do?”  In early December 1931, Hoover suggested to Stimson the idea of 
“non-recognition.”  The President’s proposition being that since the Japanese had directly 
violated the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, the nations of the world simply refuse to 
recognize any territorial gains made in Manchuria.  Hoover tasked Stimson with drafting 
the initial doctrine of non-recognition.
46
 
In his diary, the Secretary of State writes that he woke up on the morning of 
January 3, 1932, with his “mind rather clarified” on how he would construct his canon.  
As he worked through the morning, he developed a letter that was to be sent to the 
governments of China and Japan.  The letter was designed to reassert Hoover’s 
conviction that absolutely no good whatsoever could come from a breach of peace 
treaties.  It was designed to express total disapproval to what the Japanese were doing in 
Manchuria.  Lastly, the Stimson letter was meant to add “moral teeth” to the Kellogg-
Briand Peace Pact.  When the draft was completed it was sent to the President for 
approval and Hoover accepted it.  The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition was 
dispatched to the Far East on January 7, 1932.  Hoover announced to the world on 
January 8, the policy of non-recognition.  He would use this policy as a moral weapon 
and effectively, the United States stepped to the forefront of the nations opposing 
Japanese aggression.  In essence, the Stimson Doctrine stated that the United States did 
not intend to recognize, as legally valid, any situation, treaty, agreement, territory or 
government claimed or effectuated by force in Manchuria.  It also solidified that the 
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sanctity of existing treaties must remain intact.  In the words of Secretary Stimson, “Non-
recognition might not prevent aggression, but recognition would give it outright 
approval.”47 
The doctrine of non-recognition fully safeguarded the moral position of the 
United States, at least as far as could be done without warlike action.  It put America on 
the record in terms of world support of the League of Nations and it went further by 
calling to attention the threatening of such peace machines as the Kellogg-Briand Peace 
Pact.  Ideologically it encompassed Hoover’s designs of peace.  It was announced under 
high hopes and with a sincere effort to halt aggression.  It was, however, unsuccessful.  
As historian L. Ethan Ellis states, its effectiveness can be likened to “a pebble which 
failed to halt a rushing stream.”48  The Stimson Doctrine was announced unilaterally by 
the United States and therefore left Hoover as a leader without followers.  It failed to win 
adherence from any other major power, although Great Britain and France eventually 
sent similar dispatches of disapproval.  These letters however, left out the idea of non-
recognition.  Japan saw this division between the allies and jumped on it.  In their 
response dated January 16, 1932, Japan replied with what Stimson later referred to as 
“cool cheek.”  The Japanese government agreed with Stimson about the sanctity of 
treaties (no doubt having their own treaties with China in mind) and cordially thanked the 
United States for its willingness to “support Japan’s efforts” to see that treaties were 
observed.  Japan also claimed that its aims in Manchuria were for peace only and not 
based on territorial expansion, that Japan was supporting the principle of the Open Door 
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and that the breakup of China was so far advanced that a “little further” breakup was 
justified.  Stimson felt slapped in the face.
49
 
 The Japanese did not halt their operations at the announcement of Stimson’s plan.  
Instead Japan expanded the war.  During the final week of January 1932, Japanese troops 
completed the conquest of Manchuria and stood at the Great Wall.  On January 28, the 
city of Shanghai was bombed and subsequently invaded and occupied.  The war was now 
carried into China proper, the land where the Open Door principle was first applied.  
Stimson was outraged.  Undersecretary of State William R. Castle, who felt the Japanese 
had “less justification in Shanghai than in Manchuria,” described Stimson, saying, “The 
Secretary is in a high state of excitement about the situation in Shanghai.”50  Stimson now 
began to show an eagerness to use naval action to put down the Japanese.  He met with 
Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley to discuss the issue and came to agreement that 
forceful sanctions must be made.  Stimson’s line here again became a fissure between 
himself and the President.  Hoover too was livid that Japan failed to heed many repeated 
appeals to cease aggression.  To the President, the Japanese attack on Shanghai was as 
evil as the German invasion of Belgium.  He now saw the fight more clear-cut; as right 
versus wrong.
51
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The Quaker’s line of action differed from his Secretary’s however.  Hoover 
immediately vetoed Stimson’s and Hurley’s suggestion to invoke military sanctions.  
Stimson writes in his diary: 
He [Hoover] pointed out strongly the folly of getting into a war with Japan 
on this subject; that such a war could not be localized or kept in bounds, 
and that it would mean the landing of forces in the Far East, which we had 
no reason or sense in doing.  He said he would fight for Continental 
United States as far as anybody, but he would not fight for Asia.
52
 
 
Hoover foresaw the danger of a prolonged war in Asia.  He knew the American public 
would never support such a war, nor could they afford one.  The Quaker also knew that 
taking aggressive action would only be a detriment to the peace initiatives and “great 
moral forces” of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact and the Stimson Doctrine.  He refused to 
“dispense with police force” stating, “The only police force I have got to depend upon 
today is the American Navy.”53  He did deploy troops and ships from the Asiatic Fleet to 
China as well as reinforced American bases in Hawaii and the Philippines.  Hoover’s 
purpose for this was far different from Stimson’s though.  The Quaker did this “to protect 
the lives of Americans” and to prepare in the event the Japanese moved against United 
States possessions in the Pacific.  The President issued “strict orders…that our forces 
should confine themselves to the task of protecting Americans.”54 
 The battle between Hoover and Stimson continued.  Hurley was in concert with 
the Secretary of State, arguing that the United States should “put up or shut up;” either 
use the fleet forcefully or say and do nothing at all.  Hoover believed this show of force 
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was inherently dangerous and possessed the threat to start a new war.  Stimson openly 
criticized Hoover over his “pacific policy” on several occasions saying he “lacked 
appreciation of the real nobility of the tradition and standard American doctrine towards 
China of the Open Door.”  When Stimson proposed the United States, at the very least, 
make a bluff of strength as a way to scare Japan into thinking America would use force, 
Hoover vetoed the suggestion.  The President was so much a man of peace that he did not 
even favor the notion of unspoken threats.  For this Stimson told other members of the 
administration, “He [Hoover] has not got the slightest element of even the fairest kind of 
bluff.”  In a cabinet meeting the Secretary requested “that there should be no talk or 
action by anyone which should indicate that we were not going to use any weapon that 
we might have, whether it be the fleet or the boycott [economic sanctions].”55  Hoover 
was the President, however, and therefore the policy of his nation would be his decision.  
He was always willing to listen, but never persuaded by Stimson on the issue of forceful 
sanctions.  On February 20, 1932, he told Stimson, “I hope my mind is not closed on 
anything, but it is as much closed as possible on the question of calling sanctions.”56  The 
Quaker was constantly pushing back against what was seen as the normal United States 
policy and course of action.  He was locked in a battle with his Secretary of State, a battle 
he would win. 
 Hoover continued to seek moral pressures for the solution to the current problem.  
In late January 1932, another attempt was made for conciliatory ways to end the fighting 
in the Far East.  Hoover suggested that both he and King George of Britain send open 
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appeals to the Emperor of Japan.  This plan was rejected by Britain on the grounds that it 
would go against royal etiquette for the King to participate in direct negotiations.  The 
idea was scraped.
57
  
The President and Secretary of State still had one more string left to pull.  Stimson 
was determined to strike a resounding blow for the nobility of the Open Door Policy, 
while Hoover continued to fight for the morality of the issue.  What they had in mind was 
a restatement of the non-recognition doctrine, this time with an emphasis on the Nine-
Power (Open Door) Treaty.  Stimson would write an “open letter” (one that is made 
public) setting forth the ideas of the United States as to the Open Door.  By making it an 
open letter, Stimson believed he would rouse public support and at the same time show 
the world just how far America was willing to go.  This was an old practice used by 
President Theodore Roosevelt on several occasions.
58
 
 The Borah Letter, as it was called because it was written to Senator Borah, was 
published on February 23, 1932.  It was sent one day after Japan openly repudiated the 
idea that China was strong and independent saying, “The Japanese government does not 
and cannot consider that China is an organized people within the meaning of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations.”59  With Stimson’s letter coming immediately 
following this statement, the lines were drawn.  On one side stood the United States, 
insistent on maintaining China’s independence and integrity.  On the other side, Japan 
was determined to impose a unilateral solution on the grounds that “she believes that she 
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is naturally and necessarily in a far better position to appreciate the facts than any distant 
power can possibly be.”60  Japan would continue to “fix” the situation on its own.  This 
“fix” meant expansion and industrialization in China. 
 The Borah Letter began by explaining the Open Door Policy.  It then came to a 
point and denied Japan’s contention that the Nine-Power Treaty needed to be revised 
(Japan felt that the United States’ Open Door in China was unfair because the West 
should keep out of the Far East.  Japan proposed the treaty be revised to be made more 
favorable).  The letter continued by reaffirming the non-recognition principle and 
recommended that “other governments of the world” adopt it so as to announce a 
“caveat” which would “effectively bar the legality of any right or title sought to be 
obtained by pressure or treaty violations.”61  Stimson went a step further by adding a 
distinctive element.  He suggested that the three treaties of the Washington Conference of 
1922, the Four-Power, Five-Power and Nine-Power Pacts, were “interdependent and 
interrelated.”  By this Stimson claimed that the United States had agreed to limit its navy 
in the Pacific in return for Japan’s agreement in respecting the Open Door and integrity 
of China.  He indicated that if Japan was to continue in violating Chinese integrity, the 
United States would consider itself released from limitations of the treaty and 
subsequently be justified to increasing its naval presence in the Pacific.
62
 
 Hoover was far from enthusiastic over Stimson’s later point.  Again he felt that it 
was a “forward step” toward implied force and that the United States was willing to go to 
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war.  He was correct to a point.  Stimson did have the thought of war present in his mind 
when he drafted that article.  The Secretary had begun to believe that an eventual war 
between the United States and Japan was inevitable.  He even warned Hoover that he 
“better keep his powder dry.”  In response to this, and while Stimson was away at the 
Second Geneva Naval Conference, the President instructed Undersecretary Castle to 
prepare a statement announcing to that “under no circumstance” was America going to 
war and had ruled out any sanctions.  Hoover and Stimson quarreled further upon the 
Secretary’s return.  In Japan, the letter was denounced immediately.  The United States 
Ambassador to Japan, William C. Forbes, stated that it made the Japanese people view 
the United States as “their enemy.”63  Stimson later wrote that the Borah Letter “was 
intended…and designed to encourage China, enlighten the American public, exhort the 
League, stir up the British and warn Japan.”64  
 The Borah Letter did little except raise public opinion, though only marginally.  
Peace eventually came in Shanghai in early May 1932, with Japan withdrawing its 
troops.  Friction continued in Manchuria with Japan again consolidating its position there.  
On September 15, the puppet state of Manchukuo was created and recognized by Japan.  
The Lytton Commission published its report on October 1, asserting that Japan had 
indeed violated the League Covenant but it did not recommend any sanctions.  The 
British did place an arms embargo on China and Japan, but this made little impact on the 
Japanese.  Geneva debated the Lytton Commission’s findings for months before finally 
adopting them on February 23, 1933.  This did nothing and Japan quit the League of 
Nations.  What Ellis calls “the successful Japanese adventure in Manchuria,” and what 
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the League, with its toothless documents, did was furnish a happy example to follow by 
future pupils like Benito Mussolini and his conquest of Ethiopia and Albania as well as 
Adolf Hitler’s absorption of the Rhineland.65 
 What the Manchurian Crisis offers is a fascinating study in conflicting 
personalities.  Hoover, the Quaker, the opponent of war and sanctions, did not waver one 
bit in his position.  Stimson’s repeated and resourceful maneuvers around what Ellis 
terms “an almost monolithic stand,” earn him high marks for persistence.  Ultimately 
Hoover was the Commander-in-Chief and his policies prevailed.  The rift created 
between Hoover and Stimson lasted well after the conflict was over.  Stimson was not 
Hoover’s first choice for Secretary of State.  Stimson was opinionated, stubborn and 
lacked the President’s imagination.  Hoover had more disagreements with Stimson than 
with any other cabinet member.  Hoover’s Press Secretary, Theodore Joslin, once said, 
“Stimson is a mill stone around the neck of the President.”66  After his defeat to Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt in November 1932, Hoover met with Undersecretary Castle at Camp 
Rapidan and asked him to write a book about his administration’s foreign policy.  The 
outgoing President admitted that he knew Stimson would feel he should be the one to 
write it, but as Castle said, “[He] does not want Stimson to make himself the center of the 
book because, as Hoover said, ‘He would have had us in a war with Japan before this if 
he had his way.’”67  The Quaker admitted to Castle that “he was always afraid Stimson 
would get us into real trouble through his earnest and entirely laudable desire for 
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sanctions.”68  Although the division was always present, both men respected one another.  
Stimson always yielded the final say to the President.  McGeorge Bundy later wrote that 
to Stimson, “Mr. Hoover was…one of the great Americans of his time, and one of the 
most unjustly maligned.”69    
More important than the eventual outcome of Japanese aggression, the 
Manchurian Crisis highlighted how much of a man of peace Hoover was.  He looked 
upon disarmament rather than economic or military warfare as the proper means to 
implement a pact for peace.  He looked to non-recognition as an attempt to settle a 
dispute by pacific means, spread peace and protect the world of the future.  The doctrine 
of January 7, 1932, was meant to be a new, alternative viewpoint against sanctions of 
force and a “moral disapproval” of aggression.  Non-recognition itself could be called the 
“Hoover-Stimson Doctrine.”  To Hoover, it could be considered as a final and sufficient 
measure and a substitute for economic pressure and military force.  It is a policy of 
conciliation and peace, relying on moral power for effect.  It was sparked and 
implemented by a man who used peace so his nation did not have to face war in his 
time.
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Chapter 4: War Debts and Reparations 
 
 One of the international problems President Hoover inherited when he took office 
was the multifaceted question of Allied debts owed to the United States and, indirectly, 
German reparations payments made to the Allies following World War I.  Both were 
linked.  The European Allies collected payments in the form of reparations from 
Germany, and many of them in turn forwarded these payments to America as partial 
payment of their war debts.  American loans started early in the war, when the hard-
pressed Allies borrowed heavily from private United States citizens to finance the 
conflict.  When America entered the war in 1917, the burden of loans shifted to the 
United States government.  At war’s end, the debts accumulated by the European nations 
totaled over $12 billion.  Europe had accepted the fact that debts to the United States 
could only be paid to the extent that Germany paid the reparations.  The flaw in this 
thinking was that reparations could only be made if Germany was prosperous and 
possessed a strong economy; however the very nature and harshness of reparations made 
this virtually impossible.
1
 
 Following the end of the Great War, the Reparations Commission, dominated by 
France, began calculating the cost of the war, right down to every bullet fired.  In April 
1921, the commission presented a bill to Germany totaling over $32 billion plus interest.  
This total was far less than France, who claimed to have lost the most during the conflict, 
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wanted but was far more than economists at Versailles deemed just.  Germany accepted 
under duress, and so a triangular cycle of exchanges began between Germany, the 
European Allies and the United States.  The plan was doomed to fail from the beginning 
because Germany would never be able to maintain a healthy economy this way.  
Scheduled payments failed to even meet the interest.  Germany was able to make full 
payments only through August of that year, and then made partial payments through the 
early months of 1922 before finally defaulting.  With the Allies collecting so much of 
Germany’s diminutive revenue, the defeated nation was unable to invest in its own 
industrial infrastructure.  Without that, economic growth was impossible and reparations 
payments were nothing but a plan on paper.
2
  The driving force behind such callous 
reparations was France.  The memories of the Great War were still fresh in French minds.  
France sought revenge and was determined to hold Germany responsible and deliver to 
the Germans what it deemed a deserved punishment.  France believed Germany would 
continue to be a potential threat unless weakened economically and militarily.  Therefore, 
reparations were implemented along with severe restrictions on the size and strength of 
the military Germany was allowed to maintain.  This French militant attitude would only 
serve later on to inflame German citizens and add to the rise of nationalism and 
resentment within that small nation.
3
 
 Soon after Germany defaulted on payments, Great Britain proposed, along with 
France, Italy and Belgium, to ask the United States to help study the depth of the 
reparations problem.  This study produced several commissions.  The first was the World 
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War Foreign Debt Commission, which Hoover served on as a flexible moderate.
4
  While 
serving on the commission, the Quaker suggested canceling all debts contracted before 
the armistice.  When the commission informed him that neither Congress, nor the 
American people, would approve of such an accord, Hoover instead developed a strategy 
of lowering interest rates and stretching out payments on the principle over a longer 
period of time.  He also, along with his colleagues, formulated the principle of reducing 
debts based on each nation’s capacity to pay.  Later, as President, Hoover negotiated 
agreements with individual debtor countries based on their ability to pay.  He also wanted 
to use the debts as leverage to obtain concessions from the Europeans on issues such as 
arms reductions.
5
 
 Although the United States did not ask for and did not receive reparations from 
the Central Powers, two commissions headed by Americans also convened to study the 
reparations problem.  Both delegations adopted similar plans in regards to scaling down 
payments.  The first worked from January to April 1924, and consisted of a committee of 
experts including industrialist, businessman and lawyer Owen D. Young, novelist and 
philosopher Henry Morton Robinson, and was chaired by banker and future Vice 
President of the United States Charles G. Dawes.  The product of this commission 
became known as the Dawes Plan.  It was admittedly an interim scheme dependent upon 
restoration of a viable German economy.  The plan attacked the problem from the angle 
of allowing Germany to pay a reasonable amount of what was owed.  If properly 
rehabilitated, Germany could begin paying 1 billion German marks ($250,000,000) the 
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first year and increase, over a four year period, to a maximum of 2.5 billion marks 
($625,000,000).  The arraignment was open-ended and contained no termination date.  In 
order to help jumpstart its economy and industry, Germany received a loan of 800 million 
marks ($200 million).  The Dawes Plan was finalized and went into effect on August 30, 
1924.
6
 
 Again the plan was only temporary.  It provided short-term economic benefits and 
softened the blow of reparations.  Even with the reduced payments and a loan, Germany 
was unable to maintain a secure economy.  A vicious cycle ensued.  Germany was forced 
to borrow greater amounts of money to help keep its industry afloat and make payments.  
As slight prosperity began to return, the urge to borrow more increased.  American 
bankers were more than willing to lend in order to match this desire to borrow.  Historian 
L. Ethan Ellis explains: 
A routine was thus established: American investment dollars were 
transmitted into gold marks in the German industrial and commercial 
complex; these were funneled through the reparations hopper to Western 
Europe, emerging thence as pounds, francs and lira in satisfaction of war 
debt obligations.
7
 
 
The cycle never balanced out and the debtor never caught up.  By the end of the fourth 
Dawes Plan year, Germany had paid $1.25 billion in reparations, but had borrowed $1.5 
billion.  During this time Germans also became restive.  The machinery of collection 
placed foreigners on their soil in derogation of their sovereignty.  The absence of a date 
for the termination of payments inflicted a burden of unknown duration.  The original 
reparations total of $32 billion, assigned in 1921, coupled with French insistence on 
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complete repayment, reminded Germany of France’s vindictiveness and an Allied lack of 
realism.
8
 
 As early as 1927, suggestions began circulating on the importance of negotiating 
a permanent settlement to the reparations problem.  However, it was not until early 1929 
that a committee convened to revise the Dawes Plan in the hopes of putting reparations 
on a definitive and realistic base.  Sessions ran from February 11 to June 7, eventuating in 
an agreement that was to be called the Young Plan after the committee’s American 
chairman, Owen D. Young.  The Young Plan scaled down the reparations total from $32 
billion to just over $8 billion.  It also set up a designated repayment schedule that meant 
Germany would complete reimbursement in fifty-eight-and-a-half years at an interest rate 
of five-and-a-half percent.  The total for Germany, with principle plus interest, would 
amount to around $26 billion, substantially less than the 1921 amount.  The Young Plan 
became effective in the spring of 1930.  After nearly a decade, it now seemed as if a 
solution to the reparations problem had been found.  Germany would be permitted to pay 
without undue hardship and the Allies would be able to meet their balances owed to the 
United States.  The plan did however still depend on one thing: a healthy German 
economy.
9
 
 By the spring of 1931, the economy of the United States appeared to be bouncing 
back from the collapse of October 1929.  During the first quarter of that year, 
employment had not dipped below the level of 1921-22.  Industrial output grew by five 
percent, payrolls by ten percent and stock prices by ten percent.  The Great Depression 
seemed to be bottoming out.  Then setbacks in Europe staggered the upswing and sent the 
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United States and world economies into a downward spiral.  Hoover’s hopes of ending 
the collapse in a single term faded.  Germany strained under the burden of debts.  
Although it had received help in the form of the Young Plan, Germany continued to live 
far beyond its means; floating long-term loans at unrealistically high interest rates.  When 
the debts began to fall due, Germany covered them by being issued short-term securities 
at even higher interest rates, a practice which Hoover had warned against since the early 
1920’s.  This policy of floating high interest loans was commonplace in many other 
European countries as well.  However, almost none of the money was spent on self-
sustaining projects or productive enterprises that generated jobs or consumer products.  
The majority of the loan money was being put into armaments.  Money from the United 
States, in the form of loans, continued to pour into Germany and by the spring of 1931, 
Americans held of over $2 billion in German obligations.  Since the global economy was 
linked in common dependency, the failure of securities in one nation brought down 
creditors in another.  As historian Glen Jeansonne puts it, “World investors were riding a 
merry-go-round that must either stop or spin faster and faster until it spun them off.”10 
 Austria was experiencing economic disturbances similar to those in Germany.  
Hoover writes in his memoirs that by the early 1930’s both nations had been reduced to 
“a gigantic poorhouse.”  Already mentioned, loan money was not being used to create 
any self-sustaining economies.  The only hope for salvation in the two countries was if 
they formed a customs union, which they did on March 21, 1931.  It lit an explosion in 
Europe.  This was forbidden by the Versailles Treaty because of the possibility it would 
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make Germany stronger militarily.  France and Britain declared such a merger would not 
be allowed.  Hoover felt that a union between a small state of six million people and a 
great state of sixty million people was scarcely a menace and the world economy as a 
whole would benefit rather than be threatened by such a venture.  Nonetheless, the 
European powers won and the union was vetoed.  This would only serve to the rising 
feelings of nationalism and resentment present in Germany.
11
 
 The crisis continued further when on May 13, 1931, Austria’s largest bank, the 
Kreditanstalt, collapsed.  At the time, the bank held over half of all Austrian deposits and 
its liabilities were six times its assets.  It could not withstand a bank run.  France also 
contributed to the crumble by withdrawing its gold held there, even though France 
already held Europe’s largest reverses of bullion.  With the Kreditanstalt’s collapse, 
economies all over Europe crashed due to investors’ fear and further runs on banks.  Less 
than a month after the Kreditanstalt’s closing, the German Reichsbank lost over forty 
percent of its reserves.  The panic swept across the Atlantic and reverberated in the 
United States.  American banks held between $1.2 billion and $1.5 billion in European 
securities.  Foreign orders for American commodities fell as well.  Thousands of banks 
stood threatened and American investments would be jeopardized if the collapse was not 
arrested.  Hoover now found himself faced with the task of saving the world economy.  
He began to think of solutions, instructing the United States Ambassador to Germany, 
Frederic M. Sackett, to relay a message to the German government saying the United 
States would endeavor to be helpful and that the whole reparations and debt complex 
would be reviewed in the light of capacity to pay under depression conditions.  The 
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President consulted with economists and members of his cabinet, particularly Secretary 
of State Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon and 
Undersecretary of the Treasury Ogden L. Mills.  In early June, the Quaker proposed a one 
year moratorium on all governmental debts, excluding private debts.  As the largest 
creditor, the United States would make the biggest sacrifice.
12
 
 The Hoover Debt Moratorium, as it came to be called, was the first major policy 
to meet the shock of the European collapse.  When the President first proposed it to his 
secretaries on June 5, 1931, Stimson and Mills showed support while Mellon objected, 
saying the debt crisis was Europe’s mess and America should not get involved.  Hoover 
reminded him that the strain was worldwide.  Reparations payments totaled more than $1 
billion per year, of which the United States received roughly $250 million in the form of 
war debts payments.  The crisis was indeed linked between continents.  Tensions were 
high.  Congress, not the President, controlled debt policy.  They were not in session 
however.  The moratorium would have to be ratified by Congress and approved by all the 
nations included.  The President spent days interviewing and speaking with members of 
Congress and foreign leaders, via the transatlantic telephone, the first true diplomatic use 
of this instrument.  Remembering the failure of President Woodrow Wilson’s Versailles 
Treaty, he wanted to ensure there was enough support for his plan before announcing it 
publically.  In a fit of pique, Congress later billed Hoover for all international calls.  Most 
members of Congress approved with the major dissenters being Joseph Taylor Robinson, 
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Democratic Leader of the Senate, and John Nance Garner, Speaker of the House, also a 
Democrat.  Internationally there was much support; naturally France was opposed.
13
 
 On June 18, Hoover received a cablegram from German President Paul von 
Hindenburg stating that the Weimar Republic was in dire straits and requesting the 
Quaker’s intervention: 
…Germany has urgent need for relief.  The relief must come at once if we 
are to avoid serious misfortune for ourselves and others....You Mr. 
President, as the representative of the great American people, are in a 
position to take steps by which an immediate change in the situation 
threatening Germany and the rest of the world could be brought about.
14
 
 
Hoover’s statement was nearly complete.  He had gained enough support, both 
domestically and internationally, and planned to release it on June 22.  He 
urgently impressed upon all members of Congress that the subject must be kept 
confidential until he could present his course of action.  Utah Senator William H. 
King leaked it “off the record” to the press however, forcing the President to 
announce it two days sooner, on June 20, 1931.  The moratorium was a bold move 
that paid off.
15
   
 Most nations approved, as the moratorium would save Germany, Austria 
and most of Eastern Europe.  The French balked at the idea, raising a host of 
technical self-serving difficulties.  They were annoyed at its premature 
announcement and stood to lose $79 million in reparations payments during the 
moratorium year.  France also did not want to see its brutal enemy strengthened in 
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any way.  The French knew however that if Germany’s economy failed, theirs 
would be dragged down as well.  French Prime Minister Pierre Laval and Foreign 
Minister Aristide Briand supported the accord, but ultimately the decision lay 
with the French Chamber of Deputies.  A three week wrangle ensued.  
Meanwhile, further runs on Central and Eastern European banks became rampant.  
The President knew the longer the delay, the less effective an impact the 
moratorium would make.  Finally, on June 5, Hoover instructed the United States 
Ambassador to France, Walter Evans Edge, to inform the French government that 
he had secured enough support and did not require the inclusion of France on the 
moratorium.  Hoover said the French might continue to exact payments from 
Germany when they fell due; however, other nations would do the same to 
France.  This meant that the United States would continue to expect French 
payments of war debts.  The Quaker stated that this would leave France little 
better off than if it accepted the moratorium and would serve to isolate the French 
from world opinion.  Upon receipt of Hoover’s final message, the French Cabinet 
hurriedly reversed itself and accepted the debt moratorium on July 6, 1931.
16
   
 It was a historic accomplishment.  On that day, the President proclaimed, 
“I breathed easier in the hope that it [the debt moratorium] might still save the 
situation.”  Britain hailed it as evidence the United States was taking a greater 
leadership role in Europe.  The mayor of Berlin suggested Hoover for the Nobel 
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Peace Prize.  The stock market temporarily stabilized and there was a momentary 
lift in the economies of the world.  When Congress returned to session in the 
winter of 1931, the Quaker set about getting them to ratify the moratorium.  
Congress convened on December 7, only eight days before the next installment of 
war debts was due.  Hoover announced to foreign leaders that they would not be 
held in default if Congress failed to ratify by the due date.  The President worked 
with individual members and committees.  Some were worried that if the 
moratorium was approved, Germany might never pay.  Hoover countered that if 
the agreement was killed, they would surely never pay.  A potential default later 
was better than an immediate and absolute one now.  Ultimately Congress agreed 
with Hoover and the House enacted the moratorium by a vote of 317-100 on 
December 19, with the Senate approving on December 22, by a vote of 69-12.  
Both added the stipulation that the debts were only to be postponed and never 
cancelled.  A one year moratorium on payments of reparations and 
intergovernmental debts was made effective retroactively to July 1, 1931 (Hoover, 
in fact, had wanted to make the moratorium for two years but doubted it could be 
ratified).  Based on the biannual schedule of repayment, this effectively postponed 
payments until December 15, 1932.  Although the Hoover Debt Moratorium 
helped to save Germany from internal political and economic crisis, it succeeded 
only temporarily.  However, Hoover’s actions were unprecedented, courageous 
and flew in the face of domestic and international opposition.
17
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 The President’s work with debt relief did not end with the Hoover Debt 
Moratorium.  The moratorium did nothing to relieve private debts owed to 
American and Western European bankers by the Germans.  There was a huge 
international indebtedness hanging over the world in the form of short-term loans.  
These had been issued between banks at high interest rates that could not possibly 
be met.  These loans were soon to fall due and cause major European banks to 
collapse.  As with the moratorium, the choice lay between holding off and 
perhaps getting something later, or getting nothing at all when economies 
crumbled.  Hoover and Congress however, lacked the constitutional authority to 
intervene in private debts.
18
 
 As the European banks began closing, Hoover asked Secretary Mellon 
what types and what value there was of American loans and deposits in the banks 
of the crisis area.  Mellon gave an astonishing report.  American interests in 
Central and Eastern European banks exceeded $1.7 billion, most in short-term 
bills between sixty to ninety days.  The United States also had another $2 billion 
invested in the banks of Britain, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Denmark and 
Switzerland.  These banks going into default comprised a major threat to 
American bank holdings.  The problem arose when so much long-term debt 
accrued; governments began floating short-term loans as a means to pay for the 
long-term debts.  Germany in particular had been making reparations payments 
with borrowed money.  This “kiting” of bills, Hoover states, “Was the explosive 
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mine which underlay the economic system of the world.”  It quickly became 
obvious that Europe was unable to meet its short-term obligations.
19
  
 Attempting to fend off the threat of further collapse, Hoover instructed 
Secretary Stimson to engage in conversations with Great Britain to effect a 
“standstill agreement.” This would do for private debts held in Germany and 
Europe what the moratorium did for intergovernmental debts.  To the Quaker, the 
issue now went from helping foreign countries to the indirect benefit of all, to one 
of saving world economies.  Hoover intended to take a strong hand.  France 
countered with a proposal that a world loan should be granted to Germany in the 
amount of $500 million to stave off collapse.  Hoover rejected this, saying the 
debt crisis was banker-made and the bankers should shoulder the crisis, not the 
taxpayers.  He also viewed the loan as only partial relief of the banks at the 
government’s expense.  To him, it was a wholly inadequate solution as such a 
loan would not even be enough to cover the amount owed to the United States.  
The Bank of England was also against the loan.  Hoover sent his “standstill” 
proposal before the London Economic Conference in July 1931, where it was 
debated before being accepted and then finalized in Basel, Switzerland in late 
August.
20
 
  The London Economic Conference of 1931 was a meeting between 
economic experts and statesmen from the major powers to plan the tactical 
implementation of Hoover’s initiatives as well as to discuss Europe’s economic 
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future.  The conference also attempted to salvage the German economy before it 
completely crumbled.  Stimson and Mellon were already in Europe and 
represented the United States in London.  Although the Standstill Agreement was 
negotiated there, the conference made no major breakthroughs.  Germany had 
hoped to receive massive new loans but this proved to be impractical.  Hoover 
said it would be “like pouring water into a bucket with holes,” as more money 
continued to leave German than the amount that entered it.  The Germans were 
given $100 million in credit for three months, which was spent in just nine days.  
As Hoover was an internationalist, he did favor the aggressive role the United 
States was beginning to play in European diplomacy, something that until then 
had been unprecedented in peacetime.
21
 
 The Standstill Agreement was an agreement among bankers, not 
governments, in which creditors would offer additional time before collecting on 
international private debts.  The Wiggins Committee locked the agreement in and 
placed bank acceptances on a standstill until September 1, 1931.  A second 
standstill was negotiated in early 1932, extending the agreement until March 1, 
1933.  This accord concluded the development of formal American policy toward 
war debts and reparations.  The effects of the moratorium and standstill were 
nothing more than palliative, however.  Hoover was, nevertheless, able to keep 
the panic of Central and Eastern Europe from spreading across the Atlantic and 
the world breathed a sigh of relief.
22
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 The Hoover Debt Moratorium and Standstill Agreement were only 
reprieves.  The Quaker earned praise for at least making an effort to solve the 
problems of European politics.  He gained good will toward the United States.  
Nonetheless, both agreements were followed by a collapse in Germany.
23
 
 Europe continued its descent into the depths of the economic nightmare 
when Great Britain soon followed Germany off the “economic merry-go-
round.”24  The British pound sterling, which was the pillar of international 
finance, had been stressed to the breaking point by the crisis in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  Following World War I, the pound had been pegged 
unrealistically high.  As it began to decline, the British continued to live far 
beyond their means as well as sacrifice their own security by making loans to 
Germany.  The Royal Treasury was drained.  On September 21, 1931, Great 
Britain ceased redeeming domestic credits with gold bullion; effectively leaving 
the world gold standard.
25
 
 In 1931, international commerce was supported by gold-backed currency.  
World currencies were based upon convertibility into gold.  The central banking 
systems of each nation held substantial gold reserves to protect convertibility and 
foreign exchange.  Since unbacked currency was theoretically worthless, a nation 
could not issue more currency than it could support with gold.  Gold was placed at 
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a certain value that ensured predictability in foreign exchanges.  The ebb and flow 
of trade and credit resulted in some movement of gold from one country to 
another for the settling of balances; however, the economies fluctuated but 
remained in check.  It was a delicate balance that Hoover likened to “a loose 
cannon on the deck of the world in a tempest-tossed era.”26 
 The immediate effect of Britain abandoning the gold standard was a 
violent fluctuation in the values of world currencies.  The worldwide equilibrium 
was disrupted.  The dominoes fell and more than two dozen countries followed 
Great Britain’s lead and suddenly there became no criterion to measure the worth 
of the world’s currency.  Fearing the United States might be the next to leave the 
gold standard, foreigners started removing their gold from America while 
domestically United States citizens began withdrawing more of their own money.  
There was a run on the banks and by the end of 1931, some two thousand plus 
banks failed.  Hoover feared he would have to announce to the public that the 
nation was dangerously close to losing control of its currency.  Great Britain’s 
abandoning of the gold standard undermined the American and world banking 
systems.  This, combined with the Hoover Debt Moratorium and the Standstill 
Agreement, meant that much of the world’s assets were frozen and the volume of 
global trade declined from $39 billion in 1929 to just $12 billion by early 1932.  
Hoover later concluded that the roots of the Great Depression were not in the 
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October crash of the American stock market, but in economic and political 
problems in Europe following the Great War.
27
 
 As discussed in a previous chapter, the Quaker established the precedent 
of summitry in peacetime with foreign leaders and dignitaries when he welcomed 
British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to America in 1929.  Hoover 
continued this model twice in the fall of 1931 when French Prime Minister Pierre 
Laval and Italian Foreign Minister Count Dino Grandi both redeemed invitations 
to parley with the President in Washington.   
 Laval was first, arriving in New York on October 22, 1931, then traveling 
by train, getting to Washington the following day.  With no dramatic issues at 
stake, the talks focused mainly on economics and disarmament.  The search for a 
solution to the problems of war debts and reparations continued.  For the Prime 
Minister, the real purpose of the visit was to urge reduction of French war debt 
payments to the United States, even though France held enough gold on deposit to 
cover future debt payments for the next five to six years.  Laval also sought the 
meeting because a state visit to America might help his stature domestically.  
Hoover assured Laval that the basis of American war debt settlements was based 
wholly on the capacity to pay; again seeking an agreement that was both firm but 
flexible.  The Quaker attempted to impart his generosity upon the Prime Minister 
by urging him to ask the French government to relax some of the unnecessarily 
severe restrictions on Germany.  This he asked for in the interest of maintaining 
the German democratic regime.  Laval, acting hypocritically because he wished 
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the United States to reduce or cancel French war debts, rejected Hoover’s request 
because France still saw a revived Germany as a threat.  The President also 
claimed that Congress would never approve the reduction or cancelation of war 
debts.  The American public would almost surely be against it as well; they would 
never agree to pay higher taxes in order to relieve Europeans.  Both sides 
remained immovable on the issue but the Quaker promised to be as flexible as 
possible.
28
 
 Hoover also took the opportunity during the conclave to seek French 
support for the upcoming Geneva Disarmament Conference.  The Quaker 
explained that the French could benefit from arms reduction by saving money and 
resources.  In fact, they actually stood to save more by reducing arms than from 
any annulment of war debts.  Hoover emphasized that bigger armies did not 
guarantee peace, they only added to the carnage in the event a war actually came.  
Laval was sympathetic to the idea of disarmament but France as a whole refused 
to disarm without the creation of an alliance with the United States in the form of 
a consultative pact.  Hoover said no president could agree to such a pact and even 
if he did, Congress would surely defeat it.  Clearly France and the United States 
would not agree on disarmament issues.
29
 
 The leaders canvassed the world’s economic situation, and on these issues, 
there was some agreement between the two men.  Hoover asked Laval to help 
stop the drain of gold used to back American currency.  The Prime Minister 
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agreed with the President and said he had already taken steps to help save the gold 
standard in America.  Both Hoover and Laval agreed that it was crucial to have as 
many nations as possible remain on the gold standard.
30
 
 On the many matters, both men simply agreed to disagree.  The President 
and Prime Minister issued a statement indicating that they both sought to use the 
moratorium period to seek a long-term agreement on the question of war debts.  
“Our especial emphasis has been upon the more important means through which 
the efforts of our governments could be exerted toward restoration of economic 
stability and confidence,” they said.31  They believed the starting point in 
approaching the debt question should be found in the initiative to solving the 
reparations problem.  On a personal basis, the meeting was straightforward and 
cordial.  Hoover found Laval to be amiable and logical, yet stubborn when it came 
to his own country’s interests. As Jeansonne states, “Laval gained domestic 
prestige from the summit, and Hoover made a friend.”32 
 Hoover’s second visitor of that fall was the Italian Foreign Minister, Count 
Dino Grandi.  As there were no major areas of disagreement between the United 
States and Italy, Grandi came with nothing to request and nothing to offer.  His 
arrival in early November was purely a good will gesture.  The Italians also 
wished to “keep up” with the French, so Grandi came in response to Laval’s visit.  
The young, charismatic Foreign Minister charmed the American press.  He was 
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fluent in English, so there was no need for translators.  Grandi was an advocate of 
world peace and had proposed a one-year moratorium on the manufacture of 
weapons.  He wanted to cooperate with America at the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference and also helped try to persuade France that security lay in 
disarmament.
33
 
 Grandi’s visit was a social equivalent of a fireworks display, but it also 
included substance.  He explained that the United States and Italy were the only 
well-armed nations willing to disarm.  The Foreign Minister stated that 
overpopulation was a major concern in his homeland.  The Italians imported 
much of their raw material and food, so he proposed that America could find a 
market for agricultural exports in Italy.  Most important, Grandi’s visit cemented 
the Italian-American friendship and it was praised and acclaimed worldwide.  
However, his trip made him too successful for his own good and Italian dictator 
Benito Mussolini became jealous and fired Grandi in July 1932.  Nonetheless, it 
culminated Hoover’s precedents for peacetime summitry.34 
 The final attempt at solving the war debts and reparations problem during 
Hoover’s time in office came at the European Conference at Lausanne, 
Switzerland from June 15 to July 8, 1932.  The aim of the conference was to 
permanently resolve the reparations issue.  The attendees included Great Britain, 
Germany and France.  The United States was invited but did not formally attend 
because Hoover’s hand was tied by Congress.  However, Hoover did demonstrate 
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support of the conference’s final agreement.  The three powers finally conceded 
that Germany was bankrupt and hammered out a treaty providing a virtual end to 
reparations.  This, they claimed, was of course dependent on a “gentlemen’s 
agreement” that America would cancel European war debts.  Again knowing that 
Congress and the American people would never approve of such action, Hoover 
argued that since his days at Versailles he had never considered reparations a 
good idea and that the United States had never asked for any.  The Quaker did 
offer to negotiate individually with each debtor nation, based again on their 
capacity to pay.  What really needed to happen was for Americans to abandon 
their pertinacious determination to collect and Europeans to concede that the 
President could not cancel war debts without Congressional approval.  The 
Lausanne Conference did effectively end German reparations payments.  As far as 
war debts payments to the United States, only token payments were made after 
the summer of 1932.
35
  As a show of support for the cancellation of reparations, 
Hoover said in a statement through Undersecretary of State William R. Castle, 
“The American government is pleased that…the nations assembled at Lausanne 
have made a great step forward in stabilization of the economic situation in 
Europe.”36 
 The Quaker’s work to resolve the problems of war debts and reparations 
was truly a noble effort.  He never agreed with reparations and opposed them 
immediately after the Great War.  On the matter of war debts, he held the nations 
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of Europe accountable and expected those countries to repay what was owed; 
sparing the American people from being subjected to further hardship during an 
already difficult era.  Hoover applied his Quaker virtues of compassion and aiding 
one’s neighbor and continued his relief efforts by instigating his moratorium and 
standstill agreements.  He attempted to add the glue of peace to a situation that 
was rapidly crumbling.  These efforts were undermined by the collapse of the 
world gold standard and the growing chaos in Europe.   
 The crisis of economic turmoil in Germany and Austria brewed political 
instability.  In Germany, threats from the Communists on the left and Nazis on the 
right added to the bedlam.  Violence began to erupt.  More than a decade of 
French political and economic harshness and inflexibility toward Germany took a 
toll on the people of that nation.  They felt beaten, weakened and humiliated.  
Nationalism began to grow.  Adolf Hitler claimed his party, the National 
Socialists, or Nazis, was the only alternative to Communism.  As the Weimar 
Republic crumbled, a power vacuum developed.  The Nazis grew stronger and 
Hitler consolidated his power.  Prior to Hitler, France was the most nationalistic 
nation in Europe.  Now Hitler used the French authoritative attitude to rally the 
German people.  He announced that Germany deserved better than to be treated 
inhumanely.  Hitler’s programs helped Germany out of the depression sooner than 
most nations and when Hoover traveled to Europe in 1938, he met with Hitler and 
commented that the state of the German economy was better than that of the 
United States.  This return to prosperity came at a price, however.  Hitler 
cemented himself in a dictatorial role and began sowing the seeds of resentment 
101 
 
 
 
and bitterness in Germany.  By the end of the 1930’s, Germany was bent on 
revenge.  The climate was ripe and the stage was set.  Even in the Mediterranean, 
Mussolini had hardened Italian diplomacy and steered it towards a union with 
Berlin.  A dark storm was brewing and there was nothing Hoover could do to 
avert the world’s destiny: another brutal war was looming on the horizon.37
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Conclusion: Visions of a Lasting Peace 
 
 Polls of historians ranking United States Presidents from the 1930s-present, even 
those confined to conservative historians, consistently rank Herbert Hoover near the 
bottom of all Chief Executives.  Polls of the general public rank him even lower.  For 
most Americans, the only thing Hoover is remembered for is his failure to end the Great 
Depression.
1
  This is beginning to change, however, especially since the opening of the 
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum in 1962.  The library has opened up 
and made available a plethora of primary sources that are helping to revive Hoover’s 
legacy.  A few scholarly works also exist that add light to the Quaker.  David Burner’s 
1979 biography, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life, gives a fair and balanced overview of 
Hoover’s life and career.  Richard Norton Smith’s An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of 
Herbert Hoover, published in 1984, is an essential life study of the President.  Smith was 
formerly the Director of the Hoover Presidential Library.  The Presidency of Herbert C. 
Hoover, written by Martin Fausold and published in 1985, is the most valuable study 
confined to the thirty-first President’s time in office.  The most comprehensive of any 
books written on Herbert Hoover, and those of greatest value to this study, are The Life of 
Herbert Hoover series biographies.  Authored by George H. Nash (three volumes), 
Kendrick A. Clements, Glen Jeansonne and Gary Dean Best (each with one to their 
credit), the series offers a complete overview of the Quaker’s life from his birth and 
childhood, through his mining career, into his time as President and finally up to his later 
years and death.  The final two volumes (Jeansonne and Best) were published in 2012 
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and 2013 respectively, and prove to be the most up-to-date sources of information on 
Hoover.  These, coupled with other monographs, dissertations and articles favorable to 
the Quaker, are nowhere near comparable to the vast quantity of sources that denigrate 
him as a complete failure as President, however.  This thesis not only tries to give an 
analysis of Hoover’s foreign policy in relation to his humanitarian values, but it also adds 
to the small niche of sources attempting to rescue Hoover from the “graveyard of the 
presidents.”2 
 Hoover was a pragmatist who possessed a lifelong idealistic streak.  As President, 
he was more idealistic than either his immediate predecessor or his successor.  Historian 
Glen Jeansonne writes, “History is a mixture of storytelling and analysis…historians are 
umpires, and sometimes umpires, however scrupulous, miss calls.”3  So why is Hoover 
viewed poorly when studying the Presidency?  He too often is compared to his 
predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  Images of the Great Depression are etched in 
people’s minds.  Black and white newsreels and photographs of breadlines, hobos, bonus 
marchers, the dust bowl and “Hoovervilles” have transcended time and end up at 
Hoover’s doorstep.  Roosevelt, on the other hand, had three complete terms and a few 
months into a fourth in office to secure a positive legacy.  FDR’s “bag of tricks” included 
his giant political machine, harnessing of the media and pushing blame off on others, 
particularly blaming the Great Depression on the Quaker.   
The depression began before Hoover, worsened during the Crash of 1929 and 
ended at the start of World War II.  Roosevelt is mistakenly credited with its ending.  He 
is also held in high regards as winning the war, even though he died while in his fourth 
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term and the Second World War ended under President Harry S. Truman.  Most 
presidents who are deemed successful in the latter half of the twentieth century, have 
been credited with winning a war, i.e. Roosevelt and Truman (and even Dwight D. 
Eisenhower to an extent) with World War II, Ronald Reagan with facilitating an end to 
the Cold War and George H.W. Bush with expelling Saddam Hussein and his forces from 
Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm of the Gulf War of 1990-1991.  Conversely, 
presidents who have “lost” wars have had their presidency’s left in ill repute, such as 
Lyndon Baines Johnson with the Vietnam War. 
 Hoover, however, does not deserve to be pinned with blame for the Great 
Depression.  When it comes to domestic policy, he was among the most active of all 
United States Presidents.  He erected more public works projects than any previous 
president, including Boulder Dam (later renamed Hoover Dam).  He negotiated 
agreements with business and labor, supported amendments to restrict child labor, 
maintain wages, and prevent strikes.  He rearranged farming and home credits, created 
loan programs for banks and businesses, encouraged agricultural cooperatives, 
discouraged hoarding and expanded the currency.  He accomplished all of this with a 
divided Congress in which his own party was factionalized.  Hoover was realistic about 
the depression, treading the line between despair and false hope.  Under his leadership, 
America did better economically than most of the Western world.
4
 
 Hoover did great things domestically; however, his foreign policy is the focus of 
this thesis.  The Quaker devoted more time to foreign relations during his single term 
than Roosevelt did during his first term.  He learned on the job and under circumstances 
that offered no precedents.  The foundation of the Humanitarian’s foreign policy was 
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establishing a lasting peace.  He initiated the Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin 
America.  Dispelling the policies of his predecessors, he repaired broken relations 
between the continents of the Western Hemisphere.  Hoover broke President William 
Howard Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy” and instituted a systematic military disengagement in 
Latin America.   
Hoover opposed war and instituted machinery aimed at maintaining world peace.  
He employed the leverage of public opinion against aggression through the use of the 
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact.  More tangible was disarmament, and his leadership during 
the London Naval Conference in 1930 led it to be largely successful.  He was prudent, 
even-tempered and possessed sound judgment.  There was a time to make things happen 
and a time to let them happen.  If Hoover would have led the United States into a land 
war with Japan over Manchuria in 1931-33, America most likely would have lost.  At 
best, the conflict might have produced bloody and drawn-out fighting, culminating in a 
stalemate.  Instead, he approved of the Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition, warning 
that sanctions might lead to war.   
Hoover was an internationalist.  He instituted the Hoover Debt Moratorium and 
Standstill Agreement as measures to save world economies and prevent pain and 
suffering.  He endorsed Versailles and the World Court, defying the position of many in 
his own party.  He also favored the League of Nations, yet he was more realistic about it 
than Woodrow Wilson.  The Humanitarian presented a proposal at the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference in 1932, and had it been accepted, it would have made 
offensive wars nearly impossible.
5
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 The Geneva Disarmament Conference convened on February 2, 1932.  More than 
forty nations assembled to broaden the details of the failed Geneva Naval Conference of 
1927.  Disagreement from the beginning, particularly on the part of France, ensured 
eventual failure.  France proposed that the League of Nations should have an army, 
equipped with troops and arms, in order to preserve world peace.  This proposal was 
contrary to everything the conference was hoping to accomplish.  The usual wrangle 
between nations, similar that that of all previous disarmament summits, ensued.  After 
more than four months of gridlock, Hoover took control and proposed a massive 
disarmament plan.   
The “Hoover Plan” was to slash offensive weapons and tilt the advantage toward 
defensive arms.  Hoover proposed his plan through American Ambassador to Belgium 
and his close friend, Hugh S. Gibson, on June 22, 1932.  Gibson read the plan to the 
delegates, while Hoover released it to the press.  In it, the Quaker proposed to ban mobile 
artillery, armor breaching guns, bombers, most submarines and long-range ships as well 
as reduce land armies by about one-third.  Hoover estimated that, in addition to 
preserving world peace, his plan would save the nations of the world between $10 and 
$15 billion over ten years.  It was the boldest plan ever presented and it made headlines 
worldwide.   
Most small nations approved.  France and Japan rejected the proposal.  Italian 
Foreign Minister Count Dino Grandi was sympathetic, but Benito Mussolini was 
opposed.  The Soviet Union announced hypocritically that it was a peaceful nation and 
the Hoover Plan did not go far enough.  The Soviets then called for all nations to totally 
disarm.  The Geneva Disarmament Conference died a slow death and ended in 1934 
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without any major agreements.  Hoover knew his plan would never be adopted in its 
entirety, but he did hope to use it as a basis for negotiation.  Still, it was revolutionary and 
not until Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met at Reykjavik, Iceland in 1986, was 
more sweeping disarmament proposed.
6
 
 By the fall of 1932, Hoover was a lame duck president.  The long and tough 
interregnum preceding Roosevelt’s taking office saw a battle between the President and 
the President-elect and would cement Hoover as the scapegoat for Roosevelt and the 
Great Depression.  FDR had no plans for anything in his upcoming administration.  He 
was arrogant, uninformed, ignorant and in over his head intellectually.  He did not 
understand any of the current issues facing the United States and the world.  FDR refused 
to cooperate with anything Hoover was proposing to combat the depression, which was at 
its lowest point.  Roosevelt was uncooperative because he did not want to see any 
improvements on the Quaker’s watch, lest Hoover get credit for it.  Being cynical and 
politically motivated, Roosevelt wanted to take over when things were the worst, blame 
Hoover, and then take credit for any revival that might occur.  FDR also refused to 
cooperate with the World Economic Conference in 1933.  He had not a single notion of 
how the world economy was interrelated; much less have any policy towards it.  He 
changed his tune after inauguration and supported the conference but sabotaged it by 
changing United States policy in the middle of deliberations.   
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On war debts, Roosevelt made no attempts to compromise with nations, as 
Hoover had.  FDR claimed that war debts were “not his baby.”  Consequently, the foreign 
nations defaulted and American lost greatly.  Something could have been salvaged had 
Roosevelt acted.  FDR also refused to lend a hand during the Banking Panic of January 
1933, when the outgoing Hoover wanted to jointly declare a banking holiday.  As a result 
of Roosevelt’s ineptness and attitude, the interregnum was wasted and the economic 
situation of the world suffered further.  The New York Herald Tribune wrote of the 
discrepancies between Hoover and Roosevelt, saying, “Americans are so accustomed to 
having Mr. Hoover do the right and courageous thing…Mr. Hoover has now done his 
utmost…Mr. Roosevelt has felt unable to aid him….”7  The Baltimore Sun quoted, 
“…[war debts] may not be legally his baby until the third of March…but Mr. Roosevelt 
might wisely have given thought to the possibility that this baby, which is not now his, 
may soon develop into an unruly stepchild, permanently lodged under his roof….”8  
Although Roosevelt would not cooperate, this marked the first time an outgoing president 
attempted to collaborate with an incoming president of an opposing party. 
 Hoover was also very wise and almost prophetic.  He had the ability to see 
beyond the present, judge things and make decisions based on how things might one day 
be.  The Quaker was more often ahead of his times than behind them.  He predicted 
communism would implode, only being wrong on the timing.   
The Humanitarian also foresaw another war, despite his attempts to avert it: the 
Second World War.  By 1931, German President Paul von Hindenburg ruled by decree, 
but his control was slipping.  Fighting between the Communists and Nazis grew 
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pandemic.  Reparations, an extremely weak global economy and the fleeing of gold from 
Germany were causing the partnership of von Hindenburg and German Chancellor 
Heinrich Bruning, the twin pillars of the old German order, to crumble.  During the 
election of 1932, Adolf Hitler ran against von Hindenburg and lost, however, Hitler was 
hugely popular.  Following meetings with von Hindenburg, on January 30, 1933, Hitler 
was appointed Chancellor of Germany, replacing Franz von Papen.  This occurred within 
three months of Roosevelt’s inauguration on March 3.  Hitler immediately began to 
consolidate his power and would soon begin breaking treaties and moving towards war.  
Hoover had long since warned that the forces of the world were causing a storm to brew 
into a war.  He attempted to prevent war but his actions were for naught and his fears 
came to fruition on September 1, 1939, when Hitler’s army invaded Poland.9 
 Of all the world leaders of his time (FDR, Winston Churchill, Hitler, Joseph 
Stalin), only Hoover avoided some degree of recklessness.  He led by example and with 
moral conviction.  He kept true to his Quaker upbringing and never boasted or self-
promoted.  He did not cudgel, badger or browbeat people (as LBJ would come to so 
famously do), instead he preferred to reason and persuade them.  Maintaining his Quaker 
virtues, he was uninterested in fortune and more interested in humanitarian relief.  
Hoover gave up his lucrative mining career to save Belgium and Northern France.  As 
President, he did not take pay, instead redistributing his salary to charity.  Hoover was the 
first of only two presidents to do this (John F. Kennedy was the other).  The Quaker 
could be stubborn and principled, yet most often he was also flexible.  Jeansonne writes, 
“He was a principled pragmatist.”10  Hoover possessed a great mind, yet his 
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humanitarianism was greater. 
 Hoover left Washington in March 1933, a defeated man.  He was disappointed 
that he was never appreciated by voters and that he was not credited for his best results.  
However, he still carried the flame of his virtues and continued to play a prominent role 
in world affairs.  He traveled the world as a sort of unofficial ambassador for the United 
States.  In March 1938, the same month as Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria, he visited ten 
European countries, including Germany.  The ex-President met with Hitler at the Reich 
Chancellery in Berlin, where both men discussed economic and social points.  The 
meeting was not without dramatics, however.  Hitler noted the difference between the 
president of a democratic nation and the leader of a dictatorial regime, telling Hoover, 
“You may be able to indulge in cooperation…I just order.”11 The Fuehrer also hinted at 
Germany’s all too near expansion by claiming that Germany’s need for additional food 
would ultimately lead to armed confrontation with the Soviets over the Ukraine’s 
breadbasket.   
Hoover admitted that Hitler was a seemingly rational man with considerable 
intellect who was capable of making his case.  Also, references to democracy or 
communism prompted furious outbursts “complete with gutter language and purple-faced 
shouting” from the Fuehrer.  Hitler leapt to his feet and ranted for several minutes 
without interruption before Hoover finally told him to sit down.  “That’s enough…I’m 
not interested in your views,” said the ex-President.  The Quaker concluded that an 
American jury would judge the German leader insane.  Later, after the outbreak of World 
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War II, Hoover became an advocate for providing relief to Nazi-occupied nations.  He 
was instrumental in creating the Commission for Polish Relief and the Finnish Relief 
Fund.  He never lost touch with his humanitarianism.
12
 
Hoover continued to take an interest in American politics for the remainder of his 
life.  In 1936, he publically endorsed the Republican Governor from Kansas, Alf Landon, 
for president against Roosevelt.  However, Hoover himself might as well have been the 
nominee as FDR’s campaign virtually ignored Landon and ran against the former 
President, constantly attacking him in speeches and continuing to make him the 
scapegoat for the all things wrong in America.  The Democrats even made the outrageous 
claim that if Landon was victorious, he would place Hoover back in the White House as a 
secret power manipulating Landon like a puppet.  The Quaker was asked later in life how 
he was able to deal and cope with the constant attacks and the unrelenting blame others 
put on him.  He replied with a humorous candor, “I outlived the bastards.”  That he truly 
did.  The stress, and occasionally violence, of the presidency brought early deaths to 
Abraham Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt and Johnson, Hoover, however, lived to be 
ninety.
13
 
 The Hoovers moved out of the White House and lived for a time in New York’s 
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel before returning back their residence in Palo Alto, California, 
where Hoover enjoyed returning to the Bohemian Club.  When Lou Henry died of a heart 
attack at the age of sixty-nine in 1944, Hoover moved back to New York and lived the 
remainder of his life in the Waldorf Towers apartment 31-A.  Lou Henry was the love of 
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his life and the couple had been married for nearly half a century.  Hoover was 
heartbroken and never dated or remarried.
14
 
 The Quaker lived out the remainder of his days as a simple man, but that is not to 
say he did not remain busy.  Already an author of many books, Hoover continued to write 
extensively.  He penned his three volume memoirs in 1951-1952.  He also wrote a four 
volume work titled American Epic, about the various relief efforts he directed.  In all, 
Hoover is credited with over 100 writings about politics, the world, relief and fishing.  He 
also made time to answer personal letters from children.  Hoover continued to love 
children, again harking back to his own painful childhood, and became one of the 
founding fathers of the Boys Clubs of America.
15
 
The Sage of 31-A, as Richard Norton Smith calls Hoover, was not incompetent or 
inert.  In his memoirs, Hoover lists a summary of his foreign policies.  They include: a 
reorganization of the United States-Latin American relationship, the advancement of 
pacific methods of settling controversies by direct treaties, the doctrine of non-
recognition, collaboration with the League of Nations, elimination of frictions between 
the United States and Great Britain and the ending of naval competition, the Hoover Debt 
Moratorium and Standstill Agreement, actively pushing for revision of war debts and 
reparations and striving to reduce world armies and aggressive weapons in a quest for 
world peace.  Anyone who believes Hoover was a “do-nothing” president, need look no 
further than this list.
16
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Hoover was comfortable in silence and that is how he lived after the presidency.  
Ostracized by Washington he did not return to the White House until 1945, at the request 
of President Truman.  He helped to oversee the transition from Truman to Eisenhower 
and warned IKE of the rough seas ahead.  “You’re going to have one of the most 
frustrating jobs that any president ever had,” said Hoover.  Eisenhower had to govern in 
the shadow of Roosevelt and was the first Republican executive in twenty years.   
On a personal basis, there have been fewer kinder presidents.  Historian William 
Eckley writes, “Hoover is preeminently a man of ideals…[he] was not willing to give up 
his optimistic faith…and also in that sense, his ideas are worth revisiting.”  Indeed his life 
and presidency are worth revisiting and resurrecting.  Hoover should be considered a 
near-great president because he managed insurmountable problems with unmatched 
dedication and deftness.  The South Pasadena News published an article shortly before 
Hoover left office titled President Hoover Carries On.  It states, “In the face of 
difficulties as great as those faced by Washington and Lincoln, he [Hoover] has stood 
steadfast at the helm, holding to those traditions that have kept our nation on a safe 
course.”17  Hoover held his nation together during a turbulent time.  He was unselfish and 
accepted criticism.  His public service did not begin or end at the presidency.  From a 
small Iowa farming town, to Stanford labs, to the depths of mines in Australia and China, 
to the presidency and to old age and death, the poor orphan boy, Herbert Hoover, used his 
Quaker faith and virtue to aid is neighbors, family, friends, nation and the world with his 
polices of humanitarianism.
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